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ABSTRACT
Success Only and Attribution Retraining in
the Alleviation of Depression and Learned Helplessness
(September 1978)
Linda Jane Sobelman, B.S., State University of
New York at Stony Brook
M.S., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Castellano Turner
Theory in the area of learned helplessness postulates
that depression reflects a belief that actions and conse-
quent events are causally unrelated. The affective and
motivational disturbances associated with depression are
believed to result from this primary cognitive distortion.
Therapy analogue studies have demonstrated that mastery
experiences will reverse the perfomance deficits associated
with depression and learned helplessness. Related research
has demonstrated that training helpless children to take
responsibility for failure and to attribute it to a lack
of effort results in improved ability to cope with future
failure.
Other researchers in the area of depression have
argued that depression reflects an exaggerated belief in
one's responsibility for negative outcomes, rather than a
V
belief in response-outcome independence. Based on the
theory that depression reflects an exaggerated sense of
personal blame, the present study postulated that a training
procedure which augments belief in personal responsibility
for events would exacerbate the depressive 's tendency toward
self-blame for failure and would have a negative effect on
subsequent performance. In order to test the difference
between these two models of depression, the present study
examined the effects of mastery experiences and attribution
retraining on depression and learned helplessness.
The experiment was conducted in three phases. In the
first phase, nondepressed subjects were divided into three
groups: a control group, a group exposed to escapable
noise, and a group exposed to inescapable noise. In the
second phase, depressed subjects, and the nondepressed
subjects pretreated with inescapable noise were given either
mastery experiences, attribution retraining or no treatment.
In the third phase, all subjects were tested on an anagram
task.
Three major findings emerged: failure to replicate the
helplessness effects demonstrated in previous studies; the
finding that the performance of depressed control subjects
was equivalent to that of nondepressed control subjects
vi
whereas, following treatment the performance of the
depressed subjects was inferior; and the finding of sex
differences in attribution for success and in reaction to
the two treatment procedures.
Results were interpreted from an attribution
theory framework. It was suggested that females have a
characterological bias toward self-depreciation which
renders them vulnerable to depression given unfavorable
life circumstances. Training which augments belief in
personal responsibility was found to be counterproductive
for depressed and nondepressed females. Depressed males,
on the other hand, responded well to attribution retraining.
It was suggested that, for males, depression reflects a
temporary diminution of self-esteem and that self-produced
success restores self-confidence.
vii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Depression
In the study of depression cognitive processes have
traditionally received little attention. The definition
of depression in the American Psychiatric Association
DSM-II reflects this viewpoint: depression is classified
as an affective disorder while any concurrent thought
disturbance is relegated to a position secondary to the
mood disorder.
Reflecting the traditional approach to depression,
analytic theories emphasize the motivational-affective
experience of loss in the dynamics of depression. Stem-
ming from Freud's (1917) contrasting of depression with
normal grief, analytic models present depression as the
reaction of an oral dependent individual to the real or
fantasized loss of narcissistic supplies. The loss leads
to regression to oral fixation and subsequent oral incorpo-
ration of the lost object. Efforts to regain self-esteem
by acquiring narcissistic supplies from the introjected
object involve turning the object-directed aggression
toward oneself.
Behavioral approaches to the problem of depression
1
have also generally focused on the importance of loss in
the precipitation of depression. S-R theorists view
depression as a function of inadequate or insufficient
reinforcers following the withdrawal of some source of
reinforcement that has been significant to the individual.
The depressed individual is seen as being on a virtual
extinction schedule and consequently showing a weakened
behavioral repertoire.
Lazarus (1968) defines loss rather broadly to include
abstract concepts as well as concrete objects. Thus, the
loss may be of money, love, status, prestige, recognition,
security, or bodily functioning.
Ferster (197 3) points out that the withdrawal of
reinforcement which precipitates a depression may be a
consequence of diverse factors such as (a) sudden environ-
mental changes, (b) punishment and aversive control, and
(c) shifts in reinforcement contingencies.
Some behavioral theorists (Ullman and Krasner, 1969;
Lazarus, 1968; Burgess, 1968) suggest that, while depression
is precipitated by loss, depressive behaviors may be main-
tained by positive reinforcement. They assert that the
depressed person is reinforced by the sympathy and
attention
of others. Lewinsohn et al. (1968), however,
recognize that
sympathy and attention for depression is at best
short-lived
and is, in the long run, outweighed by the
aversive
3consequences of annoyance with and avoidance of the
depressed person by others. Lewinsohn et al. maintain that
withdrawal on the part of others further decreases the rate
of positive reinforcement received by the depressed individ-
ual, resulting in a further accentuation of depression.
Lewinsohn et al. propose a treatment program for
depression that follows from the behavioral analysis of
depression outlined above. Its main goal is the restoration
of an adequate schedule of positive reinforcement for the
depressed individual by training him/her to emit behaviors
which are likely to be positively reinforced, and by
encouragement for engaging in activities which are inher-
ently reinforcing.
Research investigations associated with this program
(Lewinsohn and Libet, 1972; Lewinsohn and Graf, 1973) have
examined the relation between self-reported depression and
amount of reinforcement. Amount of positive reinforcement
was measured by counting the number of pleasurable activi-
ties in which subjects participated. These researchers
found a positive correlation between self-reported mood
and activity level. Difficulty in interpretation of the
da-
ta arises, however, because the direction of causality
is
unclear from these correlational studies.
An obvious question is why the depressed
person does
not initiate behaviors which are more likely to provide
new sources of reinforcement. Lewinsohn suggests that
lack of social skills is a particularly important factor
in distinguishing between those people who will seek out
new sources of reinforcement and those people who will
become depressed. Lewinsohn, however, provides no data to
support this view of the depressive as lacking in skills.
A clue may be provided by recent investigations by
Hammen and Glass (1975) . Using an experimental methodology,
rather than the correlational design employed by Lewinsohn
and his colleagues, these researchers found that inducing
depressed subjects to increase their participation in events
they had previously rated as being pleasurable did not
alleviate depressed mood. They further demonstrated that
subjects who engaged in more of the pleasurable activities
actually rated the events less positively than did subjects
in groups that did not increase their activity levels. The
authors caution against a behavioral focus on overt acts
and their consequences which may overemphasize environmental
events at the expense of cognitive mediational factors.
They suggest that:
availability of reinforcers and skills to
obtain or elicit them count for little it
the depressed person does not anticipate
that his acts will benefit him, or if he
minimizes the positive consequences of
his behaviors (p. 720)
.
Thus, the authors suggest we look to cognitive processes
to help understand why some persons react to loss by
becoming depressed, while others find new sources of rein-
forcement.
Ferster resorts to what he calls "mentalistic descrip-
tions" in order to account for the fact that the depressed
person does not engage in activities which are in his/her
repertoire and which are potential sources of reinforcement.
He cautions that we cannot assume that the depressed person
actually sees very many of the features of the surrounding
social world. The depressed person has a distorted, incom-
plete, and misleading view of the environment. Behaviorally
,
this may be manifested by:
hallucinations and delusions, distortions
of body image and physical appearance,
distortions of the depressed person's com-
petence, exaggeration of errors, complete
inability to evaluate the way other people
see him, a tendency to take the blame for
events for which there really is no res-
ponsibility, and a limited and hopeless
view of the world (p. 861)
.
Ferster maintains that the depressed person has learned
a primitive, atavistic mode of responding to frustration
which includes an increase in avoidance and escape activity
such as complaints, crying and irritability. This mode
of
reacting to frustration blocks enlargement of the person's
perception of the world because the diffuse emotional
responses are prepotent over the subtler nuances
of a
normal interaction. Were more effective methods of avoid-
ing aversive situations available to the depressed person,
they would become prepotent over the less effective, sim-
pler, and more primitive ones. Ferster concludes that
the treatment of depression should focus on increasing
the cognitive repertoire by teaching the person to observe
appropriate features of the environment. The goal would
be to increase the person's tendency to act positively on
the environment rather than to react passively and
emotionally
.
Seeds of a cognitive viewpoint are also evident in
recent ego-analytic models of depression. Bibring (1953)
suggests that the key mechanism of depression is the ego's
awareness of its helplessness in regard to its aspirations.
Oral fixation or regression may represent one of the most
common forms of depression (because of the infant's real
lack of power and dependence on others to meet its needs)
,
but is is not the core mechanism. Bibring asserts that
depression is a state of the ego which may occur at any
stage of ego-development. The defining characteristics
of
depression are the ego's awareness of its inability to
attain desired goals and the maintenance of the importance
of those goals. Bibring believes that this mechanism
represents the core of normal, neurotic, and probably
also
psychotic depression.
7A very similar viewpoint is expressed by Melges and
Bowlby (1969) . They suggest that feelings of hopelessness
underlie many forms of psychopathology and that this feel-
ing is a result of discrepancies between plans and goals.
In the case of depression, they maintain that:
while a depressed patient's goals remain
relatively unchanged, his estimate of the
likelihood of achieving them, and his con-
fidence in the efficacy of his own skilled
actions are both diminished (p. 694) .
Some experimental support for the importance of hope-
lessness and helplessness in the phenomena of depression
is provided by Melges and Weisz (1971) . Using a soliloquy
technique, these researchers found that suicidal ideation
is associated with a negative outlook on the personal
future, with a feeling of lessened personal control over
outcomes and with a diminished future time perspective.
In a series of writings (1963, 1967, 1970, 1971), Beck
details a comprehensive cognitive model of psychopathology
with special attention to the cognitive processes associated
with depression. Beck maintains that the inappropriate or
excessive emotional reaction which characterizes psycho-
pathology is a function of idiosyncratic conceptualizations
of events. Whereas in normal functioning, the
perception-
cognition-emotion sequence is largely dictated by the
demand characteristics of the situation, in
psychopathol-
ogical functioning the conceptualization of the
stimulus
8situation is determined to a greater extent by internal
processes. Beck describes the content of depressive
cognitions as reflecting a cognitive triad: a negative
conception of the self, a negative interpretation of life's
experiences, and a nihilistic view of the future. The
depressed patient:
perceives that he has irretrievably lost
something that he considers essential to
his happiness or tranquility; he expects
negative outcomes from any important en-
deavors that he undertakes; and he regards
himself as deficient in those attributes
necessary for attaining important goals
(Beck, 1971, p. 498)
.
Some experimental evidence has appeared in the litera-
ture in support of Beck's thesis that typical themes are
predominant in the thinking of depressed persons (Beck and
Ward, 1961; Beck and Hurvich, 1959) , that negative evalua-
tions of performance and negative expectations of the future
are a part of the depressive constellation (Loeb et al.,
1967; Friedman, 1964) and that cognitive distortions occur
in relation to these content areas (Hammen and Krantz,
1976).
Cognitive factors constitute a central role in the
model of depression recently proposed by Seligman (1975)
,
the learned helplessness model. Since this model is critical
to the present investigation, a detailed presentation of
the paradigm used to test this model follows.
9Learned Helplessness
Animal studies
. In the typical helplessness study, dogs
are pretreated with inescapable shock. This procedure
involves restraining the dogs in a Pavlovian hammock and
administering a series of shocks. The shocks are not pre-
ceded by any signal and they occur randomly in time. Mo
response the animal makes can influence the onset, offset,
duration, or intensity of the shocks.
Following this pretreatment , the dogs are placed in an
escape-avoidance situation within a two-way shuttlebox.
The shuttlebox consists of two compartments separated by
a shoulder high barrier. The onset of a signal (a light
dimming) marks the beginning of each trial, and the signal
continues until the end of the trial. The animal can
terminate the trial at any time by jumping over the barrier
from one compartment into the other. Shocks are adminis-
tered alternately in each compartment so that no one place
is always safe, but the response of jumping from one
compartment to the other leads to safety. Jumping the
barrier during the ten-second interval preceding the onset
of shock terminates the signal and prevents shock. If
the dog fails to jump during the preshock interval, a
shock is administered. The shock continues either until
the dog jumps the barrier or until 60 seconds have elapsed
10
since the onset of the signal, at which time the trial
ends automatically.
A naive dog (i.e., a dog not given pretreatment with
inescapable shocks) given escape-avoidance training in a
shuttlebox shows a typical behavior pattern. At the first
onset of the presignaled shock, the dog runs frantically
about the compartment, howling, urinating and defecating.
This behavior continues until the dog accidentally scram-
bles over the barrier and escapes the shock. Over subse-
quent trials, the emotional behavior subsides and the animal
becomes increasingly more efficient at escaping shock,
until it learns to avoid shock altogether. However, the
behavior of animals that have been pretreated with ines-
capable shock is strikingly different. Seligman reports
that these dogs react initially like the untreated animals.
After a short period of time, however, the pretreated ani-
mals give up running, lie down and quietly whine until the
shock terminates. On subsequent trials, the animals con-
tinue to passively sit and accept the shocks. Occasionally
these animals will jump over the barrier early in training
and escape the shock. They seem unable to profit, however,
from exposure to the barrier- jumping shock- termination
contingency. On subsequent trials the animals fail to
repeat the escape response and passively wait out the
shock.
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Seligman uses the term learned helplessness to des-
cribe the behavior of these pretreated animals and also
to refer to the process that is believed to underlie the
phenomenon. He suggests that during the pretreatment with
uncontrollable shock, the animal learns that shock termina-
tion occurs independently of all of its voluntary responses,
i.e./ that there is nothing it can do to control the shock.
Seligman proposes that the experience of uncontroliability
has motivational and emotional, as well as cognitive con-
sequences. The expectation that outcomes are independent
of responding generalizes to new situations, producing
proactive interference with later learning of response-
reward contingencies. The belief in uncontrollability
undermines the motivation to initiate responses, resulting
in decreased efforts to obtain control in later situations.
It is important to emphasize that the learned help-
lessness effects are hypothesized to be the result of a
cognitive representation, that is, the expectation of
response-outcome independence may or may not correspond
to actual objective contingencies. Conversely, mere
exposure to the contingency is not sufficient: the organ-
ism must form the expectation that outcomes and responding
are independent in order for helplessness to occur.
The emotional reaction to the perception of uncontrol-
lability follows a time course wherein the initial reaction
is one of fear. This state continues until the organism
either learns that it can control the trauma or that there
is nothing it can do to change the situation. When the
organism learns that stress can be controlled, fear dimin-
ishes or may disappear altogether. If, on the other hand,
the organism, learns that it cannot control the stress,
fear decreases and is replaced with depression.
The learned helplessness model has generated consider-
able research designed to test corollaries of the theory
and to respond to criticisms and alternative interpreta-
tions of findings. In particular, by use of a triadic
design, Seligman and Maier (1967) demonstrated that it is
not shock itself, but learning that shock is uncontrollabl
that causes helplessness. In this experiment, three group
of dogs were used. One group was pretreated with shock
that could be escaped by pressing a panel with their noses
A yoked group received shocks identical in number, duration
and pattern to the shocks given to the escape group; how-
ever, no response they made could control the shock. The
third group was not given any pretreatment . In later
escape-avoidance training in the shuttlebox, the yoked
group was significantly slower to respond than the escape
and control groups. Therefore, helplessness was demon-
strated to be a function of the experience of uncontrolla-
bility rather than mere exposure to aversive stimuli.
The helplessness response has been demonstrated in
species other than dogs, including cats, fish and rats
(see Seligitian, 1975, for a comprehensive review) .
Human studies
. Investigators have also demonstrated the
helplessness response in man. These studies parallel the
animal helplessness paradigm by pretreating subjects with
uncontrollable outcomes in the form of inescapable shock,
inescapable noise, or unsolvable cognitive problems.
Following pretreatment , the subjects are tested on a
potentially solvable task and their performance is compared
to that of subjects given prior experience with controllable
outcomes and subjects given no prior experience. Human
helplessness is demonstrated if the group given pretreatment
with uncontrollable outcomes shows performance deficits on
the test task relative to the other two groups.
In a critical review of the human helplessness studies,
Wortman and Brehm (1975) have argued that many of the
studies that purport to demonstrate human helplessness
effects have serious methodological problems, or plausible
alternative explanations. The methodological problems
generally take the form of failure to include appropriate
control groups. As discussed previously, it is necessary
to employ the triadic design devised by Seligman and Maier
(1967) in order to demonstrate that exposure to uncontrollable
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outcomes (rather than mere exposure to aversive stimuli)
results in later learning deficits. In addition, finding
that groups given controllable outcomes perform better
than groups given uncontrollable outcomes does not demon-
strate helplessness. Wortman and Brehm caution that with-
out a control group that has not received helplessness
training, such a comparison confounds the possibility that
prior experience with control results in facilitated per-
formance with the possibility that prior experience with
lack of control leads to performance decrements.
Thornton and Jacobs (1971) , for example, found that
subjects who were able to control aversive stimulation during
training performed significantly better than subjects who
were given pretreatment with uncontrollable aversive stimu-
li and subjects given no pretreatment. The latter two groups
did not differ from one another. While the authors claimed
that their results demonstrated helplessness effects in
humans, it would be more accurate to conclude that their
results indicated that experience with control in the
training session facilitated performance in the test
session.
The results of Thornton and Jacobs' study could
actually be seen as damaging to the helplessness model,
since the group given pretreatment with uncontrollable
aversive stimuli did not, in fact, perform worse than the
untreated control group. Klein (19 7 5) , however, points
out that procedural differences between Thornton and
Jacobs' study and the original animal helplessness studies
render interpretation of results difficult. During the
training task, Thornton and Jacobs explicitly told subjects
whether or not the shock would be avoidable and, for those
subjects who could avoid the shock, exactly what they had
to do to avoid it. Thornton and Jacobs speculated that
the control subjects performed as poorly as they did
because they were the only subjects not given explicit
instructions during training. Consequently, the possible
confounding of instructional set and inescapable pretreat-
ment cannot be discounted.
An early attempt by Fosco and Geer (1971) to demon-
strate learned helplessness with human subjects suffers
from the first methodological flaw discussed above: in
this study, the more experience with lack of control a
subject had, the more shocks s/he received, thereby con-
founding these two variables.
A similar problem exists with Hiroto's (1974) study
of human helplessness. Hiroto did include control groups
by giving subjects pretreatment with either escapable,
inescapable or no noise on a button-pressing training task
before testing all subjects in a human analogue to the
animal shuttlebox. Subjects in the escape and no es-
cape conditions, however, were not yoked for pattern and
duration of exposure to noise. Consequently, subjects in
the escape condition were exposed to considerably less
noise than those in the no escape condition, thereby con-
founding amount of exposure to aversive stimuli with
uncontrollability of aversive stimuli, making interpretation
of the results difficult.
Despite the methodological problems of the above
experiments, however, a number of other studies have been
successful in demonstrating learned helplessness in man
(for example. Miller and Seligman, 1975; Klein and Seligman,
1976; Hiroto and Seligman, 1975) . In addition, Hiroto and
Seligman demonstrated that helplessness transfers from
instrumental tasks to cognitive tasks and that insolubility
as well as inescapability engenders the expectancy that
responding is independent of reinforcement. These findings
regarding the generality of learned helplessness led the
authors to suggest that the process induced by uncontrol-
lability may be the rudiment of a "trait".
The issue of generalization is one that is discussed
at length by Wortman and Brehm. These authors contend
that in many of the human helplessness studies a concept
such as set can explain the fact that subjects who experi-
ence lack of control during pretreatment will continue to
assume that the testing situation is uncontrollable, while
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subjects who have experienced control during pretreatment
will not have this assxamption. Wortman and Brehm suggest
that the more removed the testing session is from the
training session, the stronger one can argue that later
learning deficits reflect an inappropriate generalization
from a situation in which the subject does not have control
to one in which s/he does have control. Separation can be
accomplished by conducting the training and test phases in
different situations, on different tasks, administered by
different experimenters.
Studies attempting such a separation of training and
testing have produced mixed results. Roth and her colleagues
(Roth and Bootzin, 1974; Roth and Kubal, 1975) and recently
Tennen and Eller (1977) , have found that under certain
circumstances the performance of subjects given pretreat-
ment with uncontrollable stimuli is superior to the per-
formance of subjects given pretreatment with controllable
stimuli or no pretreatment.
Roth and Kubal (1975) proposed a model which was later
expanded by Wortman and Brehm (197 5) , to account for these
apparently divergent findings. They suggest that expecta-
tion of control, importance of the outcome, and amount of
helplessness training interact to determine whether an
organism gives up (becomes helpless) or increases efforts
to regain control (facilitation). In brief, the model
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proposes that, if a person initially expects to be able to
influence outcomes in a situation that is of some import-
ance, then the initial reaction to finding outcomes to be
uncontrollable should be to attempt to reestablish control
through increased efforts. Continued experience with lack
of control, however, eventually results in helplessness.
The similarity between the training and test task situa-
tions presumably affects expectations of control. The
more similar the test situation is to the situation in
which helplessness training occurred, the more likely the
subject is to demonstrate helplessness effects.
In the present study, helplessness as opposed to
facilitation was the phenomenon of interest. Accordingly,
subjects were given ample experience with lack of control
(50 trials) in order to maximize the likelihood of helpless-
ness effects. The pretraining task Cunavoidable aversive
noise on a button-pressing task) was one that has been
highly reliable in producing helplessness effects in previ-
ous studies (Miller and Seligman, 1975; Klein, 1975;
Miller and Seligman, 1976) . On the other hand, it is of
theoretical interest to demonstrate that helplessness effects
are the result of inappropriate generalization rather than
merely a function of response set. Accordingly, in the
present study, the helplessness pretraining, therapy and
test phases involved different tasks, administered in
different rooms, by different experimenters.
Learned helplessness and depression
. The learned helpless-
ness model has been proposed as a laboratory analogue for
reactive depression in man. It has been suggested that
learned helplessness and depression are similar in regard
to etiology, symptomotology
,
prevention and cure. Accord-
ing to this model, reactive depression is assumed to be
caused by uncontrollable situations which lead the individ-
ual to believe that his/her responses are generally inef-
fective in obtaining reinforcement. The belief in response-
reinforcement independence is proposed as a primary symptom
of depression which can account for many of the varied
somatic, affective, and motoric symptoms that are generally
considered to be part of the depressive constellation.
In a series of studies, Seligman and his associates
have explored the relationship between learned helplessness
and depression, focusing primarily on symptom parallels.
Perceptions of response-reinforcement contingencies have
been examined using the experimental paradigm of Phares
(1957). Phares had shown that sub jects who were led to
believe that outcome on an ambiguous task was a function
of skill were more likely to raise their expectancies of
future success after a successful outcome and lower them
after failure than were subjects who were led to believe
that their performance was due to chance. In general.
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subjects given a skill instructional set change their
expectancies for future success more than subjects given
a chance instructional set.
Miller and Seligman (1973) placed groups of depressed
and nondepressed subjects in tests of skill and of chance.
Outcomes were manipulated so that all subjects experienced
the same pattern of success and failure. The experimenters
found that, while initial expectancies did not differ for
depressed and nondepressed subjects, following success and
failure the two groups showed strikingly different patterns.
The nondepressed subjects showed much greater expectancy
changes in the skill task than in the chance task. The
depressed subjects, however, did not change their expectan-
cies any more in the skill than in the chance task. These
results are consistent with predictions derived from the
learned helplessness model of depression. Specifically,
the results indicate that depressed individuals tend to
perceive reinforcement as more response independent than
nondepressed individuals in situations where reinforcement
is, in fact, response dependent.
Miller, Seligman, and Kurlander (197 5) found that when
depressed subjects were matched for anxiety with nondepressed
subjects, only the depressives showed the negative cognitive
set described above, suggesting that this cognitive distor-
tion is specific to depression.
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Further support for the learned helplessness model
of depression is provided by a series of studies conducted
by Miller and Seligman (1975, 1976). Using a 3 (inescap-
able versus escapable versus no noise) x 2 (depressed
versus nondepressed) factorial design, Miller and Seligman
(1976) replicated their 1973 finding that depressed subjects
not exposed to noise show perceptions of response-
reinforcement independence in situations that are actually
skill determined. In addition, they demonstrated that
nondepressed subjects exposed to inescapable noise exhibit
parallel deficits in perception of reinforcement contingen-
cies. Specifically, nondepressed-inescapable noise and
depressed-no noise subjects exhibited smaller decreases in
expectancy following failure in skill, but not in chance
tasks than nondepressed-no noise subjects. Similarly,
Miller and Seligman (1975) found parallels between helpless
and depressed subjects on measures of performance deficits:
nondepressed subjects given prior experience with inescap-
able noise and depressed subjects not exposed to noise
exhibited performance deficits relative to nondepressed
subjects not exposed to noise.
In sum, this group of studies by Seligman and his co-
workers have provided considerable evidence of symptom
parallels between learned helplessness and naturally
occurring depression.
other studies in the experimental literature on psy-
chological functioning in depression have produced findings
that are less clearcut than those cited above with respect
to the parallels between learned helplessness and depression.
Overall, however, there does appear to be substantial evi-
dence consistent with the learned helplessness model.
Studies by Granick (19 63) and Friedman (1964) are often
cited as evidence that depression is associated with only
minor impairments in psychological test performance.
Miller (1975) and Hale (1976)
,
however, both point out
that this conclusion does not appear to be warranted by
the data presented by these two researchers. Granick
assessed the performance of psychotic depressive and normal
subjects on information, similarities, and vocabulary tests
and found that the depressives scored lower on all three,
although the difference on the information test was the
only one that reached statistical significance (£ < .05).
Friedman (19 64) compared the performance of psychotic
depressives and normals on 3 3 cognitive, perceptual, and
motor tests, obtaining 82 scores for each subject. He
drew his conclusion of minimal differences between the two
groups on the basis of the finding that the depressives
performed significantly worse on only 4% of the test
scores. If the .05 level of significance is employed, how-
ever, then depressives performed significantly worse on
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nine of the dependent measures. In addition, Hale points
out that Friedman used two-tailed tests of significance
even though he was testing a hypothesis in which the direc-
tion of the difference was explicit. Because Friedman does
not report the means, standard deviations or t values for
any of his measures, it is not possible to determine
whether differences were significant at the .05 level (one-
tailed test) for any of the other scores.
In his comprehensive review of psychological deficit
in depression. Miller (1975) concludes that there is con-
siderable evidence of performance deficits associated with
depression. Recent studies by Hale (1976) and Tennen (1976)
provide further evidence of performance deficits in depres-
sion. Hale found that depressives performed more poorly
than normals on a digit symbol task, while Tennen demon-
strated that the performance of depressives was poorer on
anagrams and a writing speed task.
The studies cited above seem to provide considerable
evidence of symptom parallels between learned helplessness
and depression, particularly as regards perceptions of
reinforcement contingencies and performance deficits. In
addition to symptom parallels, the learned helplessness
model of depression suggests that learned helplessness and
depression should both respond to the same treatment inter-
ventions. Finding procedures that are effective in
increasing or decreasing depressive deficit are important
not only because of their obvious implications for treat-
ment. As Miller (1975) points out, such procedures also
provide us with further clues as to the factors that cause
the deficits.
Seligman suggests that experience with successful
mastery of events should reverse the perception of response-
reinforcement independence and its debilitating effects on
performance. An early study by Seligman, Maier and Geer
(1968) lends support to this proposal. By forcing helpless
dogs to perform the correct response to terminate shock and
thus repeatedly exposing them to the response-reinforcement
contingency, the experimenters were able to reverse the
performance deficits associated with helplessness pretrain-
ing. Seligman, Rosellini and Kozak (1975) report similar
results with rats. Klein and Seligman (197 6) note, however,
that in both of these studies the response in therapy was
the same response used to test for helplessness. In order
to demonstrate that a general belief in response-reinforce-
ment independence was reversed, as opposed to the animals
having learned a specific escape response, it is necessary
to use different tasks for the therapy and test phases.
Klein (1975) examined the therapeutic implications of
the learned helplessness model for man, utilizing different
tasks in the therapy and test phases. In a series of studies.
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he demonstrated that experience with controllable events
(solvable cognitive discrimination problems) reversed the
perceptions of response-reinforcement independence and the
performance deficits associated with both helplessness and
depression. These results confirmed the predictions made
by the learned helplessness model.
Recently, experimenters have begun to examine the rela-
tionship between attribution processes and the phenomena of
learned helplessness and depression. These studies appear
to have great potential for elucidating the cognitive under-
pinnings of helplessness and depression and for suggesting
effective treatment procedures. The theoretical underpin-
nings of this research stem primarily from Weiner's compre-
hensive model of attribution theory and achievement motiva-
tion (Weiner et al., 1971; Weiner, 1974).
Attribution Theory
Weiner et al. (.1971) propose that individuals utilize
four basic causal factors in attempting to explain outcomes
of achievement-related situations. The four causal factors
are ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck. That is,
in attempting to explain the success or failure of an
achievement-related action, an individual attributes his/her
own (or the actor's) level of performance to ability level,
the amount of effort that was expended, the difficulty of the
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task, and/or the amount and direction of experienced luck.
Moreover, future expectations of success and failure are
hypothesized to be based on judgments of level of ability in
relation to perceived task difficulty, as well as an estima-
tion of intended effort and anticipated luck.
Weiner has devised a two-dimensional classification
scheme for the four causal factors. One dimension along
which the factors differ is that of locus of control. Ability
and effort describe qualities internal to the actor, whereas
task difficulty and luck describe environmental or external
factors. The causal elements also vary in terms of their
relative stability over time. Ability and task difficulty
are relatively stable or invariant for any given task, while
effort and luck may vary considerably. This two-dimensional
scheme is diagrammed below:
Classification of Attributional Factors
Locus of Control
internal external
fixed Ability Task Difficulty
Stability
variable Effort Luck
Causal attributions for previous success and failure
experiences have been shown to influence both expectancy
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of future success and affective reactions to success and
failure. Several studies have demonstrated that the causal
stability, rather than the locus of control dimension,
affects estimates of future success (Meyer, 1973, reported
in Weiner et al., 1972; McMahan, 1973; Weiner et al., 1976).
That is, if causal conditions are expected to remain the
same, then the current outcome will be expected to recur.
A success attributed to ability or task ease, therefore,
increases the expectation that success will occur in the
future, while a failure attributed to lack of ability or
task difficulty strengthens the belief in subsequent fail-
ures. On the other hand, if the conditions that deter-
mined a current outcome are perceived as subject to change,
then the present outcome will not necessarily be repeated.
A success attributed to great effort or good luck, or a
failure attributed to lack of effort or bad luck, has little
effect on the expectancy of future success or failure.
Studies in the locus of control literature (employing
the research paradigm devised by Phares which was des-
cribed previously) often compare expectancy changes in
skill (ability) versus chance (luck) situations. Since
ability is viewed as an internal, stable attribute, while
luck is an external, unstable attribute, such a paradigm
prevents independent investigation of the different
effects of the two dimensions. (Implications of the
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attributional model for learned helplessness studies
employing the skill versus chance experimental paradigm
will be discussed below)
.
While the causal stability dimension plays a role in
determining expectancy of future success, the locus of
control dimension influences affective reactions to success
and failure. Weiner and Peter (1973) have shown that pride
and shame in achievement situations are maximized when out-
comes are ascribed to internal factors and are minimized
when outcomes are attributed to external causes. Thus,
success attributed to high ability or hard work results
in greater pride than success that is perceived as due to
the ease of the task or good luck. Similarly, failure
attributed to low ability or a lack of effort results in
greater shame than failure that is perceived as caused by
the difficulty of the task or bad luck. The attributional
model of achievement motivation can be portrayed by the
following schematic model:
mediating
^
locus of
_^ affect
Stimulus ^ cognitions control instrumental
about
^ ^
response
causality stability expectancy
Attribution theory and learned helplessness . In their
review of the helplessness literature, Wortman and Brehm
(1975) raise the question of whether the attribution of
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causality for lack of control will affect an individual's
feelings of helplessness. Following a line of reasoning
consistent with Weiner's model, Wortman and Brehm speculate
that the attribution of failure to one's own shortcomings
may produce greater psychological effects and generalize
further than attributions to external factors. The
studies discussed below provide recent evidence in support
of Wortman and Brehm 's contention that assignment of
causality for outcomes plays an important role in deter-
mining reactions in future achievement-related situations.
Tennen and Eller (1977) examined the effects of
manipulating causal ascriptions for lack of control on
subsequent performance. Subjects were given varying
amounts of experience on concept- formation problems with
noncontingent reinforcement. In addition, attributions of
outcome to task difficulty were manipulated via instruc-
tions. The results suggested that helplessness effects
are a function of both the amount of helplessness training
(i.e., experience with uncontrollability per se) , as well
as the availability of attributional cues. Tennen and
Eller found that when prior failure was attributed to the
difficulty of the task, helplessness effects were reversed
and subjects actually showed improved performance on a
subsequent task.
In an experiment by Dweck and Repucci (1973) , the
attributional correlates of giving up versus persistence
were explored. School children were administered a series
of unsolvable problems. Afterwards, their performance on
a series of solvable problems was examined. The authors
found that those children who persisted in the face of
failure took greater personal responsibility for success
and failure and especially tended to emphasize the role of
effort in determining outcomes. Conversely, those child-
ren who tended to give up following failure took less per-
sonal responsibility for outcomes and, even when they did
accept responsibility, attributed success and failure to
the presence or absence of ability rather than to effort.
In a later study, Dweck (1975) explored the implica-
tions of an attributional model for the treatment of
learned helplessness. Dweck argued that a treatment proce-
dure which provides subjects with only mastery experiences
(like the treatment procedure in Klein's study discussed
above), is not likely to alter subjects' reaction to
failure as a cue for continued failure and consequent
decrease in persistence.
Dweck 's subjects were school children who had been
identified as having an expectation of failure and who
showed a marked deterioration of performance in the face
of failure. Dweck 's therapy procedure involved training
half of her subjects to take personal responsibility for
failure and to attribute it to a lack of effort. The
other subjects were given only success experiences. Dweck
found that the performance of children who had received
only mastery experiences continued to deteriorate follow-
ing failure. Those children who had received attribution
retraining, however, expended more effort following failure
and demonstrated no deterioration and even a tendency toward
improved performance following failure.
The present study attempted to reconcile the discrep-
ant findings of Klein's study and Dweck 's study regarding
the efficacy of a therapy procedure which provides only
mastery experiences in reversing helplessness. The
methodology of these two studies differ in several respects,
all of which could conceivably account for the different
results obtained.
In her study, Dweck selected as subjects those child-
ren who were identified (by their school psychologist,
principal, and teacher) as having an expectation of fail-
ure and who showed a marked deterioration of performance
in the face of failure. These selection criteria present
a somewhat different picture of learned helplessness than
that proposed by Seligman and his associates. According
to Seligman 's model, the cognitive distortion evidenced in
learned helplessness involves a belief in response-
reinforcement independence. This is reflected in helpless
subjects showing smaller changes in expectancy following
success or failure in skill situations than nonhelpless
subjects. No initial difference in expectancy between
helpless and nonhelpless subjects is predicted in this
model. On the other hand, Weiner's attribution model has
shown that persons with an initial expectation of failure
should respond to failure with a greater decrease in
expectancy than persons with an initial expectation of
success. Thus, while Dweck's notion of learned helpless-
ness appears to be conceptually similar to Seligman's
concept of learned helplessness, the two differ at least
in this one important aspect.
The operationalization of learned helplessness as
the deterioration of performance in the face of failure
is also somewhat different than Seligman's conceptualization.
In the laboratory studies of helplessness, helpless subjects
are subjects who, following failure on one task, demonstrate
perforroance deficits on a new instrumental task.
This difference in the conceptualization of learned
helplessness and consequently in the nature of the subject
population could account for the failure of the success
only treatment to improve the performance of the subjects
in Dweck's study, whereas the subjects in Klein's study
showed significant improvement with this procedure. In
the present study, a success only therapy procedure was
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compared with an attribution retraining therapy procedure
given to subjects who had undergone helplessness training
in the laboratory (exposure to an inescapable aversive
tone)
.
The fact that the subjects in Dweck's study were
children with a median age of 11 years may also have played
a role in the effect of the effort reattribution on sub-
jects' performance. Weiner and Peter (1973) found that
among 10-12 year olds, effort is more important than out-
come in determining the allocation of reward and punish-
ment for achievement behaviors. Among older subjects,
however, the order of importance of these factors is
reversed. It is possible that an effort reattribution
training procedure would not have as potent an effect on
adult subjects as it did on Dweck's subjects. The present
experiment examined the effect of an effort reattribution
for failure training procedure on college age adults.
The difference between Dweck's and Klein's notion of
learned helplessness is also reflected in the use of
different methodologies. In Dweck's study, the task that
was used in the therapy phase (mathematics problems) was
the same as the task that was used to test for helplessness.
In Klein's study, a different task was used in the helpless-
ness training phase (button-pressing) , the therapy phase
(discrimination problems) and the test phase (shuttlebox
task). It is conceivable that, while Dweck's subjects
learned to respond more persistently following failure on
mathematics problems they would still tend to give up in
the face of failure on other tasks. And, in fact, Dweck's
subjects did fail to show significant changes from pretrain-
ing to posttraining on global measures of reaction in
achievement situations. As learned helplessness is thought
to reflect a fairly general belief in response-reinforcement
independence, procedures designed to alleviate helplessness
should demonstrate generalization of responses learned in
therapy. Accordingly, the present study used different
tasks during each phase (helplessness training, therapy
and testing)
.
The dependent measure selected by Dweck can also
account for the different results she obtained concerning
the effectiveness of the success only therapy as compared
to the results obtained by Klein. Dweck reports that sub-
jects given only mastery experiences continued to show
deterioration in the face of failure , whereas subjects
given attribution retraining showed substantial decreases
in their maladaptive reaction to failure . Klein's study,
on the other hand, measured overall performance on a new
task. While Dweck reports that most of the subjects in
both treatment groups showed improvement in their perform-
ance on days when they were not confronted with failure, she
does not compare the perfoinnance of the two groups on nonfail-
ure days or the overall performance of the two groups. In
the present study, the overall performance and postfailure
performance of subjects given attribution retraining and
subjects given only success experiences was compared.
Attribution theory and depression
. The attributional under-
pinnings of depression were examined in a recent study by
Tennen (1976) . This experimenter found that depressed
subjects attributed success more to luck than did nondepressed
subjects, while they attributed failure more to a lack of
effort and, to a lesser extent, lack of ability. The non-
depressed subjects attributed success more to ability and
effort than did the depressed subjects. These results are
consistent with Beck's notion (previously discussed) that
depression reflects a tendency to take personal responsibility
for failure to attain important goals. This attributional
pattern suggests that depression may, in fact, be a subset
of learned helplessness. Whereas learned helplessness
reflects a belief in uncontrollability , depression may
reflect a special case of this belief whereby failure is
attributed to oneself. Furthermore, the attributional
model suggests that ascription of outcome to effort versus
luck has affective consequences, with failure attributed to
lack of effort resulting in greater negative affect than
failure attributed to bad luck.
The results of the studies of learned helplessness and
depression discussed earlier (Miller and Seligman, 1973;
Miller, Seligman and Kurlander, 1975; Miller and Seligman,
1976) are consistent with the model suggested here. Recall
that these studies utilized the Phares (1957) chance versus
skill paradigm discussed earlier. To review briefly, these
studies found perceptions of response-reinforcement indepen-
dence in both helpless and depressed subjects. The non-
depressed subjects showed greater expectancy changes in
skill than in chance tasks, while the depressed and help-
less subjects did not show significant differences in
expectancy in skill versus chance tasks. However, sub-
jects' attributions for success and failure were not ascer-
tained in these studies. As the attributional literature
indicates, the small expectancy changes shown by depressed
and helpless subjects in the skill situation could be
caused by a belief that outcomes are determined either
primarily by luck or primarily by effort. Thus, it is
possible that while depressed and helpless subjects show
similar expectancy changes in skill versus chance situa-
tions, they do so for different reasons. The small expectancy
changes helpless subjects demonstrate following failure
may reflect the perception that failure is due to bad luck,
whereas the small expectancy changes depressed subjects
display after failure reflects a belief that failure is due
to lack of effort.
37
In the present study, while specific predictions were
not made regarding attributional patterns, the attributional
set of learned helpless and depressed subjects were further
explored.
A study by Loeb, Beck, Feshback, and Wolf (1964) on
the effects of manipulating level of performance on depres-
sive affect, has further implications for an attributional
model of depression. These researchers found that subjects
who were led to believe that their performance was superior
to others displayed more self-confidence, rated themselves
as happier and expressed greater willingness to participate
in future competitive tasks. They also found, contrary to
initial predictions, that the depressed subjects were more
affected by success than the nondepressed subjects when
the groups were asked to estimate their future level of
performance on a different task.
The authors suggest that these results are inconsistent
with the notion that depressed subjects are particularly
responsive to negative information about themselves, while
they reject positive information. However, an alternative
explanation of the results is equally plausible. Closer
examination of the procedure for manipulating level of
performance reveals that attributions for outcome were
inadvertantly manipulated as well.
The experimental procedure involved showing subjects
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that their performance was consistent (either superior or
inferior to other subjects) on four consecutive word com-
pletion lists. Frieze and Weiner (1971) have demonstrated
that outcomes that are consistent over trials tend to be
attributed to stable (task ease or ability) rather than to
unstable (luck or effort) factors. In addition, the use
of comparison subjects mitigated against task ease attribu-
tions for success. Consequently, success (or failure) on
this task would not be likely to be attributed to effort
or luck. In other words, the nature of the experimental
manipulation prevented depressives from making their usual
attribution of success to luck, encouraging instead an
attribution to ability. Conversely, nondepressed subjects
were encouraged to view failure as being due to lack of
ability, resulting in reactions to failure similar to that
of depressed subjects.
In a recent study, Klein, Fencil-Morse and Seligman
(1976) examined the effects of manipulating attributional
cues for failure on the performance of depressed and non-
depressed subjects on a subsequent task. For the subjects
given no attribution for failure, results were consistent
with previous helplessness studies. The nondepressed
subjects who were given unsolvable discrimination problems
showed later performance deficits on anagrams relative to
subjects given solvable problems or control subjects. The
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depressed subjects given no prior experience showed deficits
on the anagram task parallel to the deficits displayed by
the nondepressed subjects given experience with uncontrol-
lability. The results for the groups given attribution
for failure instructions are particularly interesting and
are discrepant with the notion that learned helplessness
and depression show parallel symptoms. For nondepressed
subjects, the attribution of failure instructions did not
affect performance. Nondepressed subjects given unsolvable
discrimination problems performed worse on the anagram task
regardless of whether the prior failure was attributed to
task difficulty, to ability, or when cues for prior failure
were not provided. In contrast, instructing depressed
subjects that their prior failure was due to the difficulty
of the task resulted in improved performance on the later
anagram task.
The authors attempt to explain these results by sug-
gesting that the differential effect of the attributional
manipulation on depressed and nondepressed subjects may
have been due to the two groups interpreting the instruc-
tions differently. They speculate that the depressed
subjects may have considered the difficult task as less
important than did the nondepressed subjects and, conse-
quently, were less affected by failure on this task. The
present writer agrees, however, with Tennen's contention
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that the Klein et al. post hoc explanation is not within
the rubric of the learned helplessness model. The results
of the studies by Dweck and Repucci, Loeb et al., and
Tennen cited above suggest an alternative explanation, one
in line with Wortman and Brehm's speculations. It appears
that failure by itself is sufficient to produce performance
deficits. However, failure that is attributed to internal
causes enhances the emotional impact as well as the per-
formance deficits associated with failure. Furthermore,
the depressive is particularly prone to react to failure
with self-blame. Consequently, relieving the depressive
of a sense of personal responsibility for failure will
cushion its impact.
Given the above line of reasoning, what would be the
effect of an effort reattribution for failure procedure on
depressed subjects? Tennen 's (1976) study offers some
suggestive evidence. Half of the subjects (depressed and
nondepressed) in Tennen 's study were led to believe that
outcome on an anagram task was primarily determined by
effort expenditure. Outcome was, in fact, manipulated by
giving half of the subjects easy letter combinations and
weighting the other half with difficult and unsolvable
letter combinations. Tennen found that, although depressed
subjects performed less well than nondepressed subjects in
both the neutral and effort-salient conditions, only the
latter difference reached statistical significance. Post-
performance persistence on a writing speed task followed
a similar pattern. In brief, depressed subjects performed
worse when led to believe that their outcomes were deter-
mined primarily by effort. These results contradict
Dweck's finding of improved performance for helpless sub-
jects given effort attribution retraining.
Tennen's results are also damaging to Seligman's
proposal of learned helplessness as an analogue to depres-
sion. If laboratory induced learned helplessness and
naturally occurring depression are analogous phenomena,
then any procedure which alleviates helplessness should
parallel therapy that alleviates depression. The present
study directly compared the effects of success only
experiences and attribution retraining on the performance
of depressed and helpless subjects.
Overview
The purpose of the present study was to examine the
differential effects of two training procedures in revers-
ing the performance deficits associated with depression
and learned helplessness.
One-hundred and twenty eight college students
screened on the basis of level of depression served as
subjects. The experiment was conducted in three phases.
The first phase was designed to induce learned helplessness
in nondepressed subjects by exposure to inescapable noise.
A nondepressed group that was not exposed to noise served
as a comparison control, and a nondepressed group exposed
to escapable noise served as a control for effects of
exposure to aversive stimuli. The depressed subjects were
not exposed to the helplessness pretreatment (i.e., not
exposed to aversive noise)
.
In Phase II, the depressed subjects and the helpless
(Nondepressed-Inescapable Noise) subjects were divided into
three therapy groups: (a) Success Only; (b) Attribution
Retraining; and (c) No Treatment control group. The
Success Only therapy groups were given experience with a
series of solvable block design problems. False feedback
was provided to subjects indicating that they had scored
in the 93rd percentile relative to a sample group tested
previously on the same task. The Attribution Retraining
groups received the same series of solvable block design
problems, but were given instructions emphasizing the
importance of effort in determining outcome on the task.
In addition, on two trials, the subject was not given
sufficient time to complete the design. On these trials,
the experimenter verbally attributed failure to insufficient
effort. The Attribution Retraining groups were given false
feedback concerning their performance level identical to
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that received by the Success Only groups.
In Phase III, all groups were tested on anagram prob-
lems, with 10% of the problems being unsolvable. Overall
performance, and the effects of failure on subsequent per-
formance were measured.
Predictions. The predictions are divided into two sec-
tions: (A) predictions concerning the effects of helpless-
ness training, and (B) predictions concerning the effects
of the different therapies.
A. Helplessness training
. The learned helplessness
model predicts that nondepressed subjects receiving pre-
treatment with inescapable noise should show later learning
deficits relative to nondepressed subjects receiving no
noise or escapable noise. Therefore, it was predicted
that:
Prediction 1: Among the No Treatment groups, nondepressed
subjects in the Inescapable Noise group should exhibit
longer latencies in solving anagrams and should fail to
solve more anagrams than the Nondepressed-No Noise and
Nondepressed-Escapable Noise groups.
Learned helplessness is proposed as a laboratory model
of depression in humans. Consequently, depressed subjects
receiving no noise and no therapy should exhibit learning
deficits parallel to those produced by uncontrollability
.
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Prediction 2: Depressed subjects receiving no therapy
should exhibit longer latencies in solving anagrams and
should fail to solve more anagrams than nondepressed
subjects receiving no noise and no therapy.
Prediction 3: Higher Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale
scores, reflecting increasing depth of depression, should
correlate with degree of impairment on the anagrams.
B. Effects of the different therapies
. The learned
helplessness model predicts that mastery experiences should
reverse the learning deficits characteristic of depressed
and helpless subjects. Consequently, it was predicted that:
Prediction 4: Learned helpless subjects (nondepressed
subjects receiving inescapable noise) given Success Only
experiences should show better anagram performance than
learned helpless subjects given no therapy.
Prediction
_5: Depressed subjects receiving Success Only
treatment should exhibit better anagram performance than
depressed subjects receiving no therapy.
Dweck (197 5) demonstrated that a procedure which alters
attributions for failure is superior to a procedure which
provides only success experiences in that it enables
helpless subjects to sustain performance despite failure.
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Consequently, it was predicted that:
Prediction 6: Learned helpless subjects given Attribution
Retraining should show better postfailure performance on
anagrams than learned helpless subjects given Success Only
therapy
.
Tennen's (1976) study indicates that depressives are
prone to self-blame following failure and suggests that a
procedure which enhances internal attributions for outcome
exacerbates the performance deficits associated with depres-
sion. Therefore, the present study predicted that:
Prediction 1_: Depressed subjects receiving Success Only
therapy should show better postfailure performance on ana-
grams than depressed subjects receiving Attribution
Retraining.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects. The subjects were 128 undergraduates who par-
ticipated in the experiment in order to fulfill course
requirements for the introductory psychology course at
UCLA. The experiment was advertised as a study of learn-
ing-performance. Volunteers were restricted to those
whose native language is English.
Data was collected from 131 subjects. However, one
male subject in the Escapable Noise group was replaced
because he did not learn to escape, while two female sub-
jects (one from the Nondepressed-Inescapable Noise-Success
Only group, and the other from the Nondepressed-Inescapable
No-Treatment group) were replaced because both had
previously participated in a similar experiment and con-
sequently were aware of the nature and purpose of the out-
come manipulation.
The subjects were assigned to depressed and nondepressed
groups according to their scores on the Zung Self-Rating
Depression Scale (Zung, 1965). Pilot testing was conducted
prior to the study in order to determine the mean Zung
Self-Rating Depression Scale score for a comparable popula-
tion. This score was used as the cutting score for
the present study. On the basis of this pilot data, sub-
jects scoring 23 or above were assigned to the depressed
group, while subjects scoring 22 or below were assigned to
the nondepressed group.
Subjects were recruited until eight males and eight
females were obtained for each of the eight groups. Thus,
a total of 24 depressed males, 24 depressed females, 40
nondepressed males and 4 0 nondepressed females were
recruited.
Experimenters
.
The experimenters were one male and one
female advanced undergraduate psychology majors, plus the
author. All are Caucasian and range in age from early to
late twenties. One experimenter administered the initial
questionnaires and conducted the helplessness training
phase. The second experimenter conducted the therapy phase.
The author conducted the test phase and debriefing.
Scoring of the depression scale and assignment of sub-
jects to groups was accomplished by computer."'" A code
number appeared on a video screen informing the first two
experimenters as to the assignment of subjects to conditions
The first experimenter had a code sheet pairing each code
number with assignment to pretreatment conditions (Escapable
On-line interactive computer terminals were used at
the UCLA Center for Computer-Based Behavioral Research.
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Noise, Inescapable Noise and No Noise), while the second
experimenter had a code sheet pairing each code number
with assignment to treatment conditions (Success Only,
Attribution Retraining or No Treatment). Consequently,
the experimenters were unaware of the subjects' overall
assignment to groups. In order to prevent the experimenter
who conducted the treatment phase from inferring that one
treatment was expected to be superior to the other, she
was told that this was an exploratory study in which dif-
fering patterns of results might follow from each treatment,
The author was not present during the helplessness training
and therapy so that, during the test phase, the author was
unaware of subjects' assignment to helplessness or therapy
groups
.
Measures .
Information sheet . The subject's name, sex, age,
year in school, major and SAT score were recorded on the
sheet. In addition, subjects were asked to rate their
degree of experience in doing word games on an 11-point
Likert scale anchored at the extremes (No experience at
all - A great deal of experience) . (See Appendix A) .
I-E Scale . The I-E Scale was devised by Rotter
(1966) to assess subjects' beliefs concerning the locus of
causality for events. The internal-external control
construct is considered to be a measure of generalized
expectancy. High scores indicate a belief that reinforce-
ments are a function of external forces (fate, chance,
luck, powerful others), whereas low scores indicate a
belief that reinforcements are a function of one's own
actions (See Appendix B)
.
The test consists of 29 items (including six filler
items) in forced-choice format. Rotter reports high
internal consistency and test-retest reliability.
Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale . The Self-Rating
Depression Scale (SDS) was devised by Zung (1965) to
assess the affective, cognitive, somatic and motoric symp-
toms of depression. The scale consists of 20 items, ten
worded symptomatically positive, and ten symptomatically
negative. Subjects are asked to determine the extent to
which each statement is true for them according to the
following five quantitative categories: none of the time,
a little of the time, some of the time, a good part of the
time, or most of the time. (See Appendix C )
.
Scores can range from 0-80 with higher scores indi-
cating a greater degree of self-reported depression. Zung
reports significant correlations between the scale and
clinical diagnoses of depressive disorder and significant
correlations with the depression scale of the MMPI. The
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SDS has been used as a measure of depression in recent
studies (Tennen, 1976; Hale, 1976) involving sub-clinical
populations.
Mood scales. Subjects were asked to rate their pre-
sent mood on an 11-point Likert scale ranging between two
extremes (e.g., extremely sad - extremely happy). Five
mood scales were used to roughly monitor the degree to
which subjects felt communicative, sad, serious, effective
and angry. Each scale consisted of a question about the
subject's present mood (e.g.. How sad are you feeling
right now?)
.
The mood scales were patterned after the
sliding scales devised by Beck and reported in Klein and
Seligman (1976). (See Appendix D)
.
Attribution rating scales
. Subjects were asked to
make causal ascriptions to luck, effort, task difficulty
and ability on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at the
extremes (not at all a factor - a very potent factor) . The
attribution rating scales were modeled after scales devised
by Tennen (1976). (See Appendix E).
Apparatus .
Helplessness training . The apparatus was a button-
pressing task modeled after the equipment reported by
Hiroto and Seligman (1975) . It consisted of two spring-
loaded buttons located on the front panel of a wooden box
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measuring 7" x 6H" x 7k", One button controlled a small
red light, while the other controlled a small green light.
Directly above and in the center of the two buttons was a
small white light labelled "correct". The aversive stimu-
lus, a 4400 hertz tone emanating from an hp audio oscilla-
tor, was presented to subjects at 90 dBA through Wollensak
3M earphones. The experimenter was seated in an adjacent
room separated by a one-way mirror. The experimenter was
equipped with a panel with lights corresponding to those
used by the subject, so that the experimenter could monitor
the subjects' responses. In addition, the experimenter's
panel contained a switch which controlled the "correct"
light, and a switch which controlled the tone.
Therapy task
. The therapy task consisted of a series
of 20 individually administered block designs. The subject
was shown a card with a nine-block design on it and was
asked to replicate the pattern with nine blocks which were
given to the subject. The blocks used to form the designs
were one-inch cubes of the type used in the WAIS, each of
which had two red sides, two white sides, and two diagonal-
ly split (red/white) sides. The designs displayed were
2x2 inch and were drawn in color (red and white) on
individual 5x7 inch filing cards. (See Appendix F) .
Test task . The test task was a series of 18 solvable
anagrams selected from a list of five-letter anagrams
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(Tresselt and Mayzner, 1966)
. Interspersed among the solv-
able anagrams were two unsolvable five-letter anagrams.
The anagrams were placed individually on 3 x 5 inch filing
cards. (See Appendix G)
.
Design. The experiment was conducted in three consecutive
yet distinct phases: helplessness training, therapy, and
testing. A diagram of this design is presented in Table 1.
In Phase I, nondepressed subjects were exposed to
inescapable noise. A Nondepressed-No Noise group served
as a comparison control, and a Nondepressed-Escapable Noise
group served as a control to test for the effects of
aversive stimuli on later performance. Depressed subjects
were not exposed to the helplessness training.
In Phase II, the Nondepressed-Inescapable and
Depressed groups were each divided into three groups:
(1) Success Only; (2) Attribution Retraining; and,
(3) No Treatment control.
In Phase III, all eight groups were tested on a perform-
ance task.
The independent variables were depth of depression
(high versus low)
,
pretreatment condition (No Noise versus
Escapable Noise versus Inescapable Noise) and therapy
condition (Success Only versus Attribution Retraining
versus No Treatment)
.
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Table 1
Diagram of Experimental Design
Nondepressed Depressed
Escapable Inescapable No Noise
H
Phase
N = 16 N = 48 N = 16 N = 48
H
1 t
SO AR NT SO AR NT
Phase
]
N = 16 N=16 N=16 N=16 N = 16 N=16 N=16 N=16
III
SO AR NT SO AR NT
lase N = 16 N=16 N=16 N=16 N = 16 N=16 N=16 N=16
Total N = 128
SO =
AR =
NT =
Success Only treatment
Attribution Retraining treatment
No Treatment control
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The dependent variables were four measures of anagram
performance (total number correct, total time, postfailure
number correct, and postfailure total time)
, mood scales
(administered before treatment and following each treatment
phase)
,
and attribution rating scales (administered after
each treatment phase)
.
Procedure
.
Subjects were recruited for a study of learning-
performance and were scheduled for individual experimental
sessions. Upon arrival, each subject was greeted by the
first experimenter, escorted into the first experimental
room and seated in front of a computer terminal and video
screen. All subjects were told that the purpose of the
experiment was to examine college students' test perform-
ance and factors that might influence performance. It
was further explained that they would be given a series of
tasks and would be asked to complete a series of question-
naires .
The experimenter then explained that the first ques-
tionnaire would be administered by computer. The subject's
name and sex were typed into the terminal, and instructions
for completing the SDS appeared on the video screen. The
subject was instructed that questions would appear on the
screen one at a time. Typing a response and pressing the
return key would produce the next question. After subjects
indicated that they understood the instructions, the experi
menter left the room so that subjects could complete the
. questionnaire in private.
upon subjects' completion of the SDS, the experimenter
returned and instructed the computer to assign a code num-
ber for the subject. The subject was told that the number
represented the file under which all of that individual's
data would be coded. In actuality, the program caused
computer scoring of the SDS and assignment to treatment
groups. The code number w-as a six-digit random number which
had previously been assigned to one of the eight groups.
The first and second experimenters each had a code list
which paired each of the code numbers to the appropriate
treatment for that phase only.
Assignment to depressed and nondepressed groups was
accomplished as described previously. The 80 nondepressed
subjects were assigned to one of five experimental groups
in the fixed rotating order: (1) Escapable Noise - No
Treatment; (2) Inescapable Noise - Success Only; (3)
Inescapable Noise - Attribution Retraining; (4) Inescap-
able Noise - No Treatment; and (5) No Noise - No Treat-
ment, with the constraint that eight males and eight female
be assigned to each group. The pattern of assignment
enabled one subject in each of the Inescapable Noise groups
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to be yoked to a subject in the Escapable Noise group for
pattern and duration of noise.
The 48 depressed subjects were assigned to one of
three experimental groups in the fixed rotating order:
(1) Success Only; (2) Attribution Retraining; and (3) No
Treatment, with the constraint that eight males and eight
females be assigned to each group.
Next, subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire
packet which consisted of the following questionnaires in
fixed order: Information Sheet, I-E Scale, Mood Scale.
Subjects were then led to the second experimental room.
Pretreatment phase
. Subjects in the Escapable Noise
and Inescapable Noise groups were given a brief sample of
the tone before being asked to continue. All subjects
decided to continue with the experiment after hearing the
sample tone.
Subjects in the Escapable and Inescapable Noise groups
were given the following instructions:
There are two buttons located on the panel
in front of you. One button controls a red
light and the other controls a green light
[experimenter demons tratedj . From time to
time, a loud tone will come on for a while.
When the tone comes on, pressing the correct
pattern of red and green will terminate the
noise. The white "correct" light in front
of you will serve as a signal for you. If
the "correct" light goes on after the noise
stops, then you have made the correct res-
ponse and have stopped the noise. If the
"correct" light does not go on, then you
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have not stopped the noise, but rather the
noise has stopped automatically according
to a preprogrammed schedule.
Subjects were then given 50 trials with the unsignaled
tone. Each trial lasted five seconds in duration, with an
intertrial interval ranging from 10-20 seconds. Subjects
in the Escapable Noise group could escape the noise by
pressing the pattern: red, red, green. if a subject in
the Escapable Noise group failed to escape the tone, it
lasted five seconds and then the next trial began. Suc-
cessful escape response was followed by the onset of the
"correct" light, which indicated that the subject had
terminated the noise. For subjects in the Inescapable
Noise groups, the buttons had no effect on the tone. For
these subjects, the experimenter terminated the trial
according to a preprogrammed schedule which yoked each
Inescapable Noise subject to an Escapable Noise subject for
pattern and duration of noise.
Subjects in the No Noise groups were given a sheet of
paper on which the letters of the alphabet were printed,
one letter to a line. They were asked to make up a code
to represent the letters, using the colors red and green.
Subjects were given 15 minutes to complete the code.
Following completion of the button-pressing task or
the control task, subjects were asked to fill out a second
mood questionnaire and an attribution rating scale. Sub-
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jects were then led to the third experimental room where
they were greeted by the second experimenter.
Therapy phase. Subjects in the Success Only and
Attribution Retraining groups were given the following
instructions for the therapy task:
1 am going to give you a series of blockdesigns. For each problem, I will show
ycpu a card with a pattern printed on itlike this one {experimenter exhibits sam-
ple cardj. Then I will give you these
nine blocks jexperimenter places the blocks
on the table between them) and ask you toduplicate the pattern printed on the card
with the blocks. Notice that each block
has two red sides, two white sides, and two
diagonally split (red/white) sides. Watch
me do this first pattern ^experimenter
demonstrates sample block design. After
the design is completed and the subject
indicates that s/he understands the task,
the experimenter disassembles the block
design and moves the blocks toward the
subjectj. Now you try it. Make the same
pattern that I just made. [^After the
subject has successfully completed the
design, the experimenter continues the
instructions. If the subject fails to
successfully complete the design within
2 minutes, the experimenter demonstrates
again
.J
I will be timing your performance
on these designs. Please indicate when
you have completed each design.
In addition, subjects in the Attribution Retraining
groups were given instructions which stressed effort
expenditure as the primary determinant of outcome.
Response latencies were measured by the experimenter
with a hand-held stopwatch. Subjects in the Success Only
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condition were given a maximum of two minutes to solve
each problem. Following problems that were correctly
solved, the experimenter made such comments as "Good" and
"You got it." Any failures to solve were glossed over,
with the experimenter merely proceeding to the next design
card.
The procedure was the same for the Attribution
Retraining groups on 18 of the 20 trials. However, on the
fourth and twelfth trials, the experimenter stopped the
subject when s/he had almost, but not completely, finished
the block design. On these trials, the experimenter com-
mented, "Time is up. You almost finished that problem.
You needed to try just a little harder in order to finish
that one in time." Following the next problem that was
correctly solved, the experimenter would note, "You got it.
See, you can do it if you try hard enough."
Following completion of the 20 block designs, the
experimenter computed the total amount of time taken to
complete the 20 designs on a pocket calculator. Subjects
were told that their score was to be compared with the
scores of a sample group of subjects who had been previously
tested on this task, and the subject was invited to view
the comparison. The total time was punched into a computer
terminal. A distribution of raw scores paired with a
percentile distribution appeared on a video screen. (See
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Appendix H for a sample distribution for a subject with a
total score of 1600 seconds). The computer had been pro-
grammed so that, no matter what score was punched in, the
feedback informed the subject that his/her raw score
ranked in the 93rd percentile, based on a sample of 378
UCLA undergraduates tested between September, 1973 and
June, 1975. The experimenter explained how a percentile
score should be interpreted and exclaimed that the subject
had performed very well.
Next, subjects were asked to complete a third mood
questionnaire and a second attribution rating scale.
Subjects in the No Treatment control groups were
first shown the block design cards two at a time and
allotted 30 seconds to select the most complex design of
each pair of cards. Then all 20 cards were laid out
before the subject and s/he was asked to rank order all
of them in terms of complexity of the design. The cards
were then shuffled and again placed in front of the subject
This time the subject was asked to rank order them from
least liked to most liked. The control subjects were also
asked to complete a third mood questionnaire and a second
attribution rating scale at this point.
All subjects were then led to a different experimental
room where they were greeted by the final experimenter.
Test phase. The order of presentation of the 20 ana-
grams was fixed for all subjects with the unsolvable ana-
grams presented on the sixth and fifteenth trials. Sub-
jects were allowed up to 90 seconds to solve each anagram.
Response latencies were measured by the experimenter with
a hand-held stopwatch.
The following instructions were given to all subjects:
I am going to ask you to solve some anagrams.
As you know, anagrams are words with the let-
ters scrambled. The task is for you to un-
scramble the letters so that they form an
English word. I will present the anagrams to
you one at a time. When you have found the
word, say it out loud to me.
The experimenter recorded each of the subject's res-
sponses, but did not provide feedback as to the correct
answer. For scheduled or unscheduled failures to solve
the anagram within the time limit, the experimenter
instructed: "Time is up. Let's go on to the next one."
Following the completion of the anagram task, subjects
were retested on the mood scales and the attribution rating
scales. The subject was then debriefed and told that the
experiment was complete.
The actual format of the experimental session is
presented in Table 2.
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Table 2
Experimental Session Format
Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale
Information Sheet
I-E Scale
Mood Scale I
Initial
Testing
Pretreatment Escapable Noise or Inescapable Noise or
No Noise control ("Morse Code")
Mood Scale II
Attribution Rating Scale I
Therapy Success Only or Attribution Retraining or
No Treatment control (Rank Order Cards)
Mood Scale III
Attribution Rating Scale II
Testing Anagram test
Mood Scale IV
Attribution Rating Scale III
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The analyses of variance and covariance of performance,
mood, and attribution ratings utilized BioMed P2V computer
programs. Correlational analyses and t- tests utilized
Statistical Package for Social Sciences computer programs.
Self-Rating Depression Scores
The means and standard deviations of the SDS scores
for the eight groups are presented in Table 4. In order to
check the effectiveness of the random assignment of subjects
to treatment groups with regard to depression scores, two
sex X treatment analyses of variance were performed: one
for subjects within the depressed group, and one for sub-
jects within the nondepressed groups. A summary of these
analyses is presented in Table 5.
The analyses indicated that, in the depressed groups,
females were somewhat more depressed than males, although
this difference was only marginally significant (F = 3.78,
df = 1/41, p = .06). There were no other significant dif-
ferences in level of depression.
In the present study, administration and scoring of the
SDS followed procedures employed by Hale (1976) and Tennen
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(1976) which involve a modification of the procedures sug-
gested by Zung (1965). in the original version, subjects
are asked to rate each of the twenty items in four quantita-
tive terms: a little of the time, some of the time, a good
part of the time, or most of the time. In scoring, a value
of one, two, three, or four is assigned to a response
depending upon whether the item is worded positively or
negatively (higher scores indicate a greater degree of
depression)
.
In order to render the scale more appropriate
for a presumably less depressed college population, the
modified version offers a fifth rating category, "none of
the time". Values of 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 are assigned to the
response categories, the order depending upon whether the
item is worded positively or negatively.
In order to enable comparison of results from the pre-
sent study with those reported by Zung, the SDS items were
rescored using the original scoring criteria. As a means
of eliminating the extra response category in the present
study, any items that had been marked "none of the time" were
rescored as if they had been marked "a little of the time".
Using this new scoring criteria, scores for the depressed
subjects ranged from 33-63 with a mean of 39.92 and scores
for the nondepressed subjects ranged from 22-35 with a mean
of 29.12.
Zung reports that the range of scores for 56 patients
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hospitalized with admitting diagnoses of depression was
30-72 with a mean of 51.7. a normal control group of 100
individuals had scores ranging from 20-35 with a mean of
26.4. While the present "depressed" subject population was
clearly less depressed than the patients reported in Zung's
study, there is considerable overlap among the two groups
and many of the subjects in the present study could be
considered to be clinically depressed.
I-E Scores
The means and standard deviations of the I-E scores
are presented in Table 6. Three analyses of variance were
performed on these data: a sex x level of depression analy-
sis was performed on all scores; within the depressed groups,
a sex X treatment analysis was performed; and within the non-
depressed groups, a sex x treatment analysis was performed.
Results of these analyses are summarized in Table 7.
Results for the overall analysis indicated that females
were more external than males (F = 6.56, df = 1/124, p < .01),
and there was a tendency for depressed subjects to be more
external than nondepressed subjects (F = 2.91, df = 1/124,
p < .09). This main effect was modified, however, by the
finding of a sex x depression interaction (F = 9.63,
= 1/124, p = .002), indicating that depressed males were
more internal than nondepressed
.ales, while depressed
females were more external than nondepressed females. The
sex difference was significant within the depressed groups
(F = 15.26, df = 1/42, p < .001), but not within the non-
depressed groups.
Within the nondepressed groups, the treatment group
main effect was significant (F = 2.58, df = 4/70, p <.05).
Pairwise comparisons were performed using the Newman-Keuls
procedure. Results indicated that subjects in the ND-IN-SO
and ND-IN-AR groups had higher IE scores than the other
three groups, and subjects in the ND-NN-0 group had higher
IE scores than the remaining two groups. Possible implica-
tions of these differences are discussed later (see Dis-
cussion)
.
SAT Scores
In order to obtain a rough estimate of intelligence,
subjects were asked to report their SAT scores on the Informa-
tion Sheet given at pretesting. Ninety-eight subjects, or
77% of the total subject group, were able to recall their
SAT scores. The means, standard deviations and number of
subjects per cell for SAT scores are presented in Table 8.
In order to check the effectiveness of the random assignment
of subjects to treatment groups with respect to SAT scores,
three analyses of variance were performed on the data: a
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sex X level of depression analysis was perforined on all
scores; a sex x treatinent analysis was performed for sub-
jects in the depressed groups; and a test for differences
within treatment groups was performed for subjects within
the nondepressed groups (the uneven distribution of missing
scores within the nondepressed groups made a sex x treatment
analysis unfeasible)
.
Results of these analyses are pre-
sented in Table 9.
For the analysis of all scores, there was a marginally
significant sex x level of depression interaction (F = 3.03,
df = 1/94, £ = .09) with depressed males reporting higher
scores than depressed females, while nondepressed males
reported slightly lower scores than nondepressed females.
The sex difference was significant within the depressed
groups (F =6.07, df =1/37, p = .02). No treatment main
effects or interactions were significant.
Experience Ratings
During the pretesting subjects were asked to rate their
degree of experience with anagrams or other word games on an
11-point Likert scale. The means and standard deviations
of the experience ratings are presented in Table 10. Three
analyses of variance were performed on these data: a sex x
level of depression analysis was performed on all scores;
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within the depressed groups, a sex x treatment analysis was
performed; and within the nondepressed groups, a sex x
treatment analysis was performed. The results of these
analyses are summarized in Table 11.
Results indicated that, within the depressed groups,
females reported having had more experience with anagrams
than males, but this difference was only marginally signifi-
cant (F = 3.29, df = 1/42, p = .08). No other effects
approached significance.
The experience ratings were used as a covariate in all
comparisons of performance measures on the anagram task.
Effects of Inescapable Noise Pretreatment
In this section results are presented for comparisons
of the nondepressed groups pretreated with escapable noise,
inescapable noise or no noise and not exposed to therapy
(ND-EN-0, ND-IN-0, ND-NN-0)
. These comparisons test for
effects of the different pretreatments
.
Pretreatment phase
. For subjects in the escapable noise
pretreatment, number of trials to escape was defined as the
trial number after which time the subject consistently
escaped the tone. Several subjects, however, after escaping
the tone reliably for a number of trials, had one or two
failures to escape. These subjects appeared to be testing
69
to see Whether the termination of the tone was, in fact
controlled by their own actions. One .ale subject, after
learning to escape on trial #17, and escaping consistently
for 20 trials, appeared to become bored and began to press
different patterns, consequently failing to escape eight of
the last thirteen trials. m view of the fact that all of
these subjects had considerable experience with mastery of
the task, the data for these subjects was included in the
final sample. As mentioned previously, one male subject
in the escapable noise group failed to learn to shut off the
noise and consequently was replaced (he solved the pattern
correctly one time, but failed to replicate the solution
during any subsequent trial)
. For those subjects who
learned the correct pattern, the number of trials to learn
to escape ranged from three to seventeen (mean = 10.0).
Anagram performance. It was predicted that among the no
treatment groups, nondepressed subjects in the inescapable
noise group should exhibit longer latencies in solving
anagrams and should fail to solve more anagrams than the
nondepressed-no noise and nondepressed-escapable noise groups
Results failed to confirm this prediction. The means and
standard deviations for the anagram performance measures for
the pretreatment test groups are presented in Table 12.
A pretreatment (escapable versus inescapable versus no
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noise) X sex analysis of covariance (with the experience
ratings obtained during pretesting used as a covariate)
indicated no differences in number of anagrams correctly
solved, total time to solve all anagrams, number of post-
failure anagrams solved, or time to solve postfailure ana-
grams. A summary of the analyses of covariance for the four
dependent measures is presented in Table 13.
M2od_data. The means and standard deviations of the mood
ratings for the pretreatment test groups are presented in
Tables 14 to 18. A repeated measures analysis of variance
(sex X pretreatment) was conducted for each of the five
mood questions. Summaries of these analyses of variance are
presented in Tables 19 to 23. There were no significant sex
or pretreatment main effects for any of the dependent measures
Differential reactions to the pretreatment conditions should
be reflected as pretreatment x phase interactions. Only
two such interactions approached significance: phase x
pretreatment for ratings of seriousness (F = 1.82, df = 6/126,
p = .10); and phase x sex x pretreatment for ratings of
effectiveness (F = 2.01, df = 6/126, £ = .07). These two
results were further examined by conducting analyses of
variance for ratings of seriousness and effectiveness at
each phase.
For ratings of effectiveness, there was a significant
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sex X pretreatment interaction at the initial testing
(F
= 3.39, df = 2/42, p = .04). The females in the ND-EN-0
group rated themselves as lowest in feelings of effective-
ness and the males in the ND-EN-0 group rated themselves
as highest in feelings of effectiveness. since the groups
had not received any differential treatment at this point,
it is likely that this difference was due to chance.
For ratings of seriousness, there was a significant
treatment effect following the therapy phase (F = 3.38,
df = 2/42, p = .04) with subjects in the ND-IN-0 group
rating themselves as less serious than subjects in the
other two groups, while these three groups received identi-
cal treatment during the therapy phase (a control task)
, it
is conceivable that the difference observed in ratings of
seriousness reflects a delayed reaction to the pretreatment
,
with subjects who had received an inescapable noise pretreat-
ment reporting themselves as feeling less serious than the
other two groups
.
Main effects for phase were found for three of the
mood questions: communicativeness (F = 3.94, df = 3/126,
P = .01), seriousness (F = 3.03, df = 3/126, p = .03), and
anger (F = 4.97, df = 3/126, p = .003). For these dependent
measures, the Newman-Keuls procedure was used to test for
differences between all possible pairs of means. Results
indicated that subjects felt more communicative and more
serious
.uring the initial testing than during any subsequent
Phase; subjects felt angrier following the pretreatment phase
than they did following the initial testing or the therapy
Phase, and subjects felt angrier following the anagram test
than during pretesting.
Attribution data
.
The means and standard deviations of the
attribution ratings for the tests for pretreatment effects
are presented in Tables 24 to 27. a repeated measures analy-
sis of variance (sex x pretreatment) was conducted for each
of the four attribution questions. Summaries of these
analyses of variance are presented in Tables 28-31.
As part of the attribution rating questionnaire, sub-
jects were asked to rate their own level of performance on
a 7-point Likert scale (1 = very poorly, 7 = very well), and
to determine whether or not their level of performance on
the task was being evaluated (1 = no, 2 = yes). These last
two questions were included as checks on experimental
manipulations. The self-rating of performance question
provides a check on the effectiveness of the experimental
manipulation of success and failure at the various tasks,
while the evaluativeness question checks whether control
tasks were perceived as being nonevaluative relative to
experimental tasks. Since the influence of level of depres-
sion and/or sex on ratings of performance and task
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evaluativeness were felt to have potential usefulness in
clarifying attributional processes, the data from these
two questions are discussed with the attribution data. The
means and standard deviations of the task rating questions
for the pretreatment test groups are presented in Tables 32
and 33. Summaries of the repeated measures analysis of
variance (sex x pretreatment) for the two task questions
are presented in Tables 34 and 35.
The following is a summary of all significant and
marginally significant effects. For subjects' ratings of
the importance of ability, there was a significant phase
main effect (F = 96.59, df = 2/84, £ < .001). For ratings
of the importance of task difficulty, the sex x pretreatment
interaction approached significance (F = 2.50, df = 2/42,
P = .10), as did the phase x sex x pretreatment interaction
(F = 2.01, df = 4/84, p = .10). The phase main effect was
significant (F = 40.22, df = 2/84, p <.001), as was the
phase X pretreatment interaction (F = 4.05, df = 4/84,
P = .005). For ratings of the importance of effort, the
phase main effect was significant (F = 27.01, df = 2/84,
p < .001). For ratings of the importance of luck, the
pretreatment effect was significant (F = 11.61, df = 2/42,
p < .001), the phase main effect was significant (F = 36.72,
df = 4/84, £ < .001), and the phase x pretreatment inter-
action was significant (F = 11.81, df = 4/84, p < .001).
For subjects, self-ratings of their level of performance,
the pretreatment main effect approached significance (P = 2 69
df
= 2/42, H = .08), the phase main effect was significant
(F
= 6.48, df = 2/84, ^ = .002), and the phase x pretreatment
interaction was significant (F = 8.59, df = 4/84, £ < .001).
For ratings of task evaluativeness
, the phase main effect
was significant (F = 18.90, df = 2/84, £ < .ool).
AS with the mood data, all effects that reached con-
ventional levels Of significance, or approached significance,
were further examined by conducting analyses of variance on
that dependent measure at each phase. For ease of under-
standing subjects' attributional analyses of the various
tasks, the discussion is organized so that results for all
dependent measures are discussed together for each phase.
Pretreatment phase. Following the pretreatment, sub-
jects who had received inescapable noise rated themselves
as having performed less well than subjects in the escapable
noise or no treatment control groups (F = 12.99, df = 2/42,
p < .001). This suggests that the inescapable noise pre-
treatment was effective in inducing perceptions of failure
in these subjects. It should be noted, however, that the
pretreatment groups did not differ in their ratings of the
evaluativeness of the task, as had been expected. There
was a significant treatment effect for ratings of the
importance of task difficulty (F = 4.39, df = 2/42, £ = .02),
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with subjects in the inescapable noise group
.ost li.ely to
attribute the outcome to task difficulty, and subjects in
the control group least likely to attribute the outcome to
task difficulty. The difference in ratings of the importance
of task difficulty between subjects in the control group
(where subjects were asked to create a "Morse Code") and the
experimental groups (where subjects were asked to discover
the correct pattern on a button-pressing task) is easily
understandable in terms of the difference between the two
tasks. For the two experimental groups, however, the task
was identical, so that differences in ratings of task dif-
ficulty must reflect reactions to the success-failure
manipulation. This finding confirms previous reports (Weiner
et al., 1971) that subjects attribute failure to task diffi-
culty more than they attribute success to task ease.
There was also a significant sex x treatment interaction
for ratings of task difficulty (F = 4.14, df = 2/41, p = .02),
with males in the escapable noise group attributing outcome
more to task than males in the control group, and females in
the escapable noise group attributing outcome less to task
than females in the control group.
Finally, subjects in the control group were less likely
to attribute outcome to luck than were subjects in the two
experimental groups (F = 25.68, df = 2/42, p < .001). Again,
this finding is readily understandable in terms of the nature
of the two tasks. Clearly, correctly guessing a random
pattern is a task that is heavily dependent on luck, whereas
devising a code for the alphabet can be seen as depending
very little on luck.
Therapy phase
.
There were no significant differences
in any of the attribution or task ratings following the
therapy phase. The reader is reminded that all subjects
involved in tests for pretreatment effects received a
neutral control task at this phase (pattern complexity-
preference)
,
so that differences in attributional ratings
would not be expected.
Anagram test. Following the anagram test, subjects
in the control group attributed outcome less to ability than
did subjects in the other two groups (F = 4.74, df = 2/42,
p = .01)
.
Phase main effects. Main effects for phase were found
for all of the attribution and task ratings. The Newman-
Keuls procedure was used to test for differences between all
possible pairs of means. Subjects felt they had performed
better at the pattern complexity-preference task than at
the pretesting or anagram testing; they rated the anagram
test as most evaluative and the pattern complexity-preference
task as least evaluative; subjects attributed outcome to
ability most for the anagram test and least for the pattern
complexity-preference task; attributed outcome to effort most
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for the anagram test; and attriubted outcome to luck most
for the pretreat:„ent task and least for the pattern complexity.
preference task.
Depressed versus Nondepressed Subjects
The reader is reminded that depressed subjects were all
treated identically at the pretreatment phase with the
neutral "Morse Code" task, and were not exposed to the
aversive noise. At the therapy phase, the depressed sub-
jects were divided into three groups: one receiving success
only experiences, one receiving attribution retraining, and
the third receiving no therapy. in this section, comparisons
are made between depressed subjects receiving no therapy
and nondepressed subjects who received no noise and no
therapy
.
Anagram performance
.
It was predicted that depressed sub-
jects receiving no therapy should exhibit longer latencies
in solving anagrams and should fail to solve more anagrams
than nondepressed subjects receiving no noise and no therapy.
Results failed to confirm this prediction. A sex x level
of depression analysis of covariance indicated no differences
among groups on any of the four performance measures. Means
and standard deviations for the anagram performance measures
are presented in Table 36. A summary of the analyses of
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covariance is presented in Table 37.
^l2od_data. The means and standard deviations of the mood
ratings for the depression effects groups are presented in
Tables 38 to 42. a repeated measures analysis of variance
(sex X level of depression) was conducted for each of the
five mood questions. Summaries of these analyses of vari-
ance are presented in Tables 4 3 to 47.
There were no significant sex main effects for any of
the dependent measures. The depression main effect was
significant only for ratings of sadness (F = 4.10, df = 1/28,
E = .05), with depressed subjects rating themselves as
sadder overall than nondepressed subjects. No interaction
effects approached significance.
Main effects for phase were found for ratings of sadness
(F = 2.93, df = 3/84, p = .04) and anger (F = 3.79, df = 3/84,
P = .01). For these dependent measures, the Newman-Keuls
procedure was used to test for differences between all pos-
sible pairs of means. Results indicated that subjects felt
sadder following the anagram testing than they did following
the pretreatment or therapy phases. Subjects also felt
angrier following the anagram testing than they did at any
of the other three ratings.
Attribution data
. The means and standard deviations of the
attribution ratings and the task ratings for the depression
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effects groups are presented in Tables 48 to 53. Repeated
measures analyses of variance (sex x level of depression)
were conducted for each of the four attribution questions
and for the two task questions. Suir^aries of these analy-
ses of variance are presented in Tables 54 to 59. Following
is a summary of all effects that reached or approached con-
ventional levels of significance.
There was a significant phase main effect for ratings
of the importance of ability (F = 32.75, df = 2/56, p < .001).
For ratings of the importance of task difficulty, there was
a significant phase main effect (F = 11. 73, df = 2/56
E < .001), and the phase x level of depression interaction
approached significance (F = 2.91, df - 2/56, p = .06).
For ratings of effort, there was a significant main effect
due to level of depression (F = 5.93, df = 1/28, p = .02),
a significant phase main effect (F = 7.52, df = 2/56,
p = .001), and a significant phase x level of depression
teraction (F = 4.78, df = 2/56, p = .01). Finally, there
s a significant phase main effect on ratings of the
importance of luck (F = 9.19, df = 2/56, p < .001). For
the task ratings, there was a significant phase main effect
for subjects' ratings of their level of performance (F = 17.94,
= 2/56, D < .001). For ratings of the evaluativeness of
the task, the sex x level of depression interaction approached
significance (F = 3,72, df = 1/28, p = .06), the phase main
m
wa
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effect was significant (P = 14.96, df = 2/56, £ < .001), and
the Phase x sex x level of depression interaction approached
significance (F = 2.71, df = 2/56, £ = .08).
All effects that reached conventional levels of sig-
nificance or approached significance were further examined
by conducting analyses of variance on that dependent measure
at each phase. Results are organized so that results for
all dependent measures are discussed together for each phase.
Pretreatment phase. Following the pretreatment phase
(where all subjects in these groups received the neutral
"Morse code" task), depressed subjects attributed their
performance to effort (F = 16.52, df = 1/28, p < .001) and
to task difficulty (F = 2.87, df = 1/28, p = .10) to a
greater extent than did nondepressed subjects. There was
also a significant sex x level of depression interaction
for ratings of the evaluativeness of the task (F = 8.79,
df = 1/28, p = . 006) . Depressed males rated the task as
more evaluative than nondepressed males, while depressed
females rated the task as less evaluative than nondepressed
females
.
Therapy phase
. Following the therapy phase (where all
subjects in these groups received the neutral pattern
complexity-preference task) , there were no significant
differences in any of the attribution or task ratings.
Anagram test
. Following the anagram test, there were
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no significant differences in any of the attribution or
task ratings.
Phase main effects
.
Phase main effects were signifi-
cant for all Of the attribution and task ratings. The Newman-
Keuls procedure was used to test for differences between all
possible pairs of means. Results indicated that subjects
felt that they had performed less well at the anagram task
than at either of the previous tasks; the anagram task was
rated most evaluative and the pattern complexity-preference
task as least evaluative; outcome was attributed to ability
most for the anagram task and least for the pattern
complexity-preference task; and outcome was attributed to
task difficulty, effort and luck more for the anagram task
than for either of the other tasks.
Correlation of SDS Scores with Performance
Measures
It had been predicted that higher SDS scores, reflecting
increasing depth of depression, should correlate with degree
of impairment on the anagrams. The correlation of SDS
scores with performance measures for control groups only and
for all groups was computed and is presented in Tables 60 and
61.
When performance scores were correlated with SDS scores
for the depressed and nondepressed control groups only
(those subjects who were not exposed to either aversive noise
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or therapy), results failed to confirm the prediction.
SDS scores did not correlate significantly with number of
anagrams correctly solved, total time, total time following
failure, or number solved following failure.
When performance scores for all subjects were considered,
however, results confirmed the prediction outlined above.
The higher the SDS score, the fewer the number of anagrams
correctly solved (r =
-0.18, p = .04), and the greater the
total time taken to complete the anagram task (r = 0.18,
P < .05). The correlations between SDS scores and number
of anagrams solved following failure (r =
-0.13, p =
.16),
and time taken to solve anagrams following failure (r = 0.16,
P = .08) were in the predicted direction, but were only
marginally significant.
It appears, then, that while increasing depth of depres-
sion was not associated with impaired performance on the
anagrams for control subjects, it was reflected in depressed
subjects showing a poorer response to treatment than non-
depressed subjects previously exposed to inescapable noise.
Some possible explanations for these findings are discussed
below (see Discussion)
.
Effects of the Different Therapies
It had been predicted that a helplessness inducing
pretreatment and naturally occurring depression would
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produce parallel performance deficits relative to control
subjects. Based on these expectations, predictions had
been made regarding the relative effectiveness of success
only and attribution retraining therapy procedures in
reversing deficits in these subjects. However, since the
data failed to indicate any performance deficits among
groups compared on the basis of level of depression, or
among groups given different pretreatment experiences,
these later questions were not pursued as initially out-
lined, instead, the data for the depressed subjects given
therapy experiences and nondepressed subjects given inescap-
able noise pretreatment followed by therapy experiences was
combined. Analyses were performed on the combined data to
examine the effects of sex, level of depression and therapy
experience on mood, attribution and performance.
Therapy phase. The number of block design problems cor-
rectly solved by subjects in the success only groups (with
20 being the maximum possible) ranged from four to twenty
(mean = 16.78). For the attribution retraining groups, the
number correctly solved (with 18 being the maximum possible)
ranged from eight to eighteen (mean = 15.34). Overall, 537
of 640 block design problems in the success only conditions
were successfully solved (84%) and 491 of 576 block design
problems in the attribution retraining conditions were
successfully solved (85%)
.
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scores for subjects in the attribution retraining
groups were multiplied by 10/9 in order to permit comparison
of the two treatments. Means and standard deviations for the
adjusted block design scores are presented in Table 62. a
three-way (sex x level of depression x therapy) analysis of
variance was conducted and is summarized in Table 63. Males
had somewhat higher scores than females, although this dif-
ference was only marginally significant (F = 3.66, df = 1/56,
E = .06). NO other differences approached significance.
Anagram performance. The means and standard deviations of
the performance measures for comparison of therapy effects
are presented in Table 64. a three-way analysis of covari-
ance (sex x level of depression x therapy) was performed
for each of the four dependent measures. A summary of these
analyses is presented in Table 65.
Results indicated a main effect for depression on all
four of the performance measures, although the effect was
significant only for total time. Compared to nondepressed
subjects, the depressed subjects solved fewer anagrams
(F = 3.90, df = 1/55. p = .05), took longer to solve the
set of anagrams (F = 5.18, df = 1/55, £ = .03), solved fewer
anagrams following failure (F = 3.08, df = 1/55, p = .09),
and took longer to solve the anagrams following failure
(F = 3.70, df = 1/55, p = .06)
.
The main effect for therapy condition approached
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significance for only one measure, with subjects in the
success only groups tending to solve more anagrams following
faxlure than subjects in the attribution retraining groups
(P = 2.75, df = 1/55, p =
.10)
.
There were no main effects for sex on any of the
performance measures.
The sex x therapy interaction was significant for two
of the performance measures and approached significance
for one other measure. Males solved more anagrams than
females following attribution retraining, while females
solved more anagrams than males following success only
experiences CF = 7.44, df = 1/55, p = .009). Males also
solved more postfailure anagrams than females following
attribution retraining while females solved more postfailure
anagrams than males following success only (F = 4.92, df = I/55,
P = .03). The sex x therapy interaction approached signif-
icance for total time taken to solve anagrams (F = 2.34,
df = 1/55, p = .13) with males taking longer following
success only, while females took longer following attribution
retraining. The pattern of results was the same for time to
solve postfailure anagrams, but the difference did not
approach significance.
Mood data
.
The means and standard deviations of the mood
ratings for the tests for therapy effects are presented in
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Tables 66 to 70. A three-way repeated measures analysis of
variance (sex x level of depression x therapy, „as conducted
for each of the five mood questions. Su^naries of these
analyses of variance are presented in Tables 71-75. Where
the repeated measures analysis of variance indicated sig-
nificant effects, or effects approaching significance, analy-
ses of variance were conducted at each phase for that depend-
ent measure.
Differences among groups in self-rated affect primarily
occurred in the comparison of depressed and nondepressed
subjects. Results of the repeated measures analysis of
variance indicated that depressed subjects felt less com-
municative than nondepressed subjects (F = 8.53, df = 1/56,
P < .005). Individual analyses indicated that this dif-
ference was significant at pretesting (F = 15.79, df = 1/56,
p < .001) and following therapy (F = 11.28, df = 1/56,
£ = .001), and approached significance following the anagram
task (F = 3.73, df = 1/56, p = .06). There was no signifi-
cant difference between depressed and nondepressed subjects
in feelings of communicativeness following the pretreatment
phase.
The repeated measures analysis of variance indicated
that depressed subjects rated themselves as sadder than
nondepressed subjects (F = 21.52, df = 1/56, p < .001).
Individual analyses indicated that this difference was
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significant during pretesting (f = 27.35, df = 1/56, p < .ool),
pretreatment (F = 9.96, df = 1/56, p =
.003), therapy
(F = 11.36, df = 1/56, p < .001), and anagrams (F = 7.71,
df = 1/56, £ = .007) .
There was a marginally significant main effect for
depression in ratings of effectiveness (f = 3.08, df = 1/56,
E = .09) in the repeated measures analysis, with depressed
subjects feeling less effective overall than nondepressed
subjects. This difference was accounted for by depressed
subjects feeling less effective following therapy (f = 3.08,
df = 1/56, £ = .09), and following anagrams (F = 5.31,
df = 1/56, £ = .03)
.
Finally, the repeated measures analysis indicated that
depressed subjects felt angrier overall than nondepressed
subjects (F = 10.93, df = 1/56, £ = .002). This difference
was significant at pretesting (F = 21.95, df = 1/56, p <
.001), therapy (F = 5.05, df = 1/56, £ = .03), and anagrams
(F = 11.19, df = 1/56, £ = .001)
.
Considered together, these results suggest that the
inescapable noise pretreatment, while failing to produce
performance deficits on a later task (anagrams) , did in
fact produce a temporary effect on subjects' moods. Depressed
subjects felt less communicative and more angry than non-
depressed subjects during all other phases, and felt less
effective following evaluative tasks (therapy and anagrams)
than nondepressed subjects. Following the pretreatment
phase, however (where nondepressed subjects were exposed
to inescapable noise while depressed subjects performed a
neutral task)
,
there was no difference between depressed
and nondepressed subjects in feelings of communicativeness,
effectiveness and anger.
One important exception to these findings, however,
was the pattern for self-rated sadness. Depressed subjects
rated themselves as feeling significantly sadder than non-
depressed subjects at all phases, including the pretreatment
phase. Implications of this finding will be discussed
further below.
There was a marginally significant depression x therapy
interaction for feelings of sadness in the repeated measures
analysis (F = 2.98, df = 1/56, p = .09), with depressed
subjects feeling sadder in the success only group than in
the attribution retraining group, while nondepressed subjects
were sadder in the attribution retraining group than in the
success only group. This interaction was marginal at pre-
testing (F = 2.84, df = 1/56, p = .09), and significant
following therapy (F = 4.33, df = 1/56, p = .05). Since
the groups had not been exposed to different treatments
prior to the initial testing, it is difficult to explain the
initial difference.
Finally, the repeated measures analysis indicated a
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significant phase x sex x depression x treatment interaction
for feelings of seriousness (F = 2.88, df = 3/168, £ = .04),
with depressed males more serious in the success only group'
and nondepressed males more serious in the attribution
retraining group, while depressed females were more serious
in the attribution retraining group, and nondepressed
females were more serious in the success only group. The
interaction was significant following the therapy phase
(F = 5.65, df = 1/56, £ = .02), and the anagram phase
(F = 4.58, df = 1/56, p = .04)
.
Main effects for phase were found for four of the five
mood questions: communicativeness (F = 10.65, df 3/168,
P < .001), sadness (F = 12.76, df = 3/168, p < .001),
effectiveness (F = 9.12, df = 3/168, p < .001), and anger
(F = 10.34, df = 3/168, p < .001). For these dependent
measures the Newman-Keuls procedure was used to test for
differences between all possible pairs of means. Results
indicated that subjects felt more communicative at pretesting
and following therapy than they did following pretreatment
or anagrams; subjects felt happier following the therapy
phase and saddest following the anagram phase; subjects
felt most effective following the therapy phase; and sub-
jects felt angriest following the anagram testing.
Attribution data
. The means and standard deviations of the
attribution ratings and task ratings for the comparison of
90
therapy effects are presented in Tables 76 to 81. Repeated
measures analyses of variance (sex x level of depression x
therapy) were conducted for each for the four attribution
questions and for the two task questions. Summaries of these
analyses of variance are presented in Tables 82 to 87.
Following is a summary of all effects that reached or
approached conventional levels of significance.
For ratings of ability, there was a marginal main effect
due to level of depression (F = 3.07, df = 1/56, p =
.09),
a significant sex x depression x therapy interaction
(F = 4.58, df = 1/56, £ = .04), and a significant phase main
effect (F = 106.28, df = 2/112, £ < .001). For ratings of
task difficulty, there was a significant phase main effect
(F = 45.49, df = 2/112, p < .001). For ratings of effort
there was a significant sex main effect (F = 4.20, df = 1/56,
P = .05), a significant sex x depression interaction (F = 7.17,
df = 1/56, £ = .01), and a significant phase main effect
(F = 53.13, df = 2/112, £ < .001). For ratings of luck
there was a marginal sex main effect (F = 3.02, df = 1/56,
£ = .09), a significant depression main effect (F = 5.68,
= 1/56. £ = .02), a significant phase main effect
(F = 16.47, df = 2/112, £ < .001), and a significant phase
X depression interaction (F = 24.99, df = 2/112, p < .001).
For self-ratings of performance, there was a significant
main effect (F = 77.02, df = 2/112, £ < .001), and a
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significant phase k depression interaction (P = 27.04,
df
= 2/112, E < .001). por ratings of the evaluativeness
Of the task, there was a marginal depression main effect
(F
= 3.85, df = 1/56, E = .06), and a significant phase
main effect (P = 21.70, df = 2/112, p < .ool).
All effects that reached conventional levels of
significance or approached significance were further
examined by conducting analyses of variance on that depen-
dent measure at each phase. Results are organized so that
results for all dependent measures are discussed together
for each phase.
Pretreatment phas... At the pretreatment phase,
depressed subjects were given the neutral "Morse Code" task
while nondepressed subjects were exposed to inescapable
noise via the unsolvable button-pressing task. Following
pretreatment, the depressed subjects rated their performance
higher than did the nondepressed subjects (F = 24.74,
df = 1/56, p < .001), and nondepressed subjects were more
likely to view the task as having been evaluative (F = 3.86,
df = 1/56, £ = ,05). These results confirm the effective-
ness of the relative neutrality of the "Morse Code" task
and the effectiveness of the inescapable tone in inducing
cognitions of failure.
Depressed subjects were more likely to attribute the
outcome to ability (F = 3.86, df = 1/56, p = .06) and
nondepressed subjects were more likely to attribute the
outcome to luck (F = 27.68, df = 1/56, p < .ool). Both of
these differences are readily understandable in terms of
the different demands of the two tasks.
Finally, there was a tendency for females to attribute
outcome more to effort than males (F = 2.77, df = 1/55,
E = .10), and a marginal sex x depression interaction for
ratings of effort (F = 3.62, df = 1/56, p =
.06), with
depressed males attributing outcome more to effort than
depressed females, while nondepressed males attributed
outcome less to effort than nondepressed females. The
significance of effort attributions will be discussed
later.
Therapy phase. Following the therapy phase, depressed
subjects attributed outcome more to effort (F = 3.71,
df = 1/56, p = .06) and to luck (F = 3.49, df = 1/56,
P = .07) than did nondepressed subjects. Similarly, females
attributed outcom.e on the therapy task more to effort
(F = 2.78, df = 1/56, £ = .10) and to luck (F = 4.41,
df = 1/56, p = .04) than did males. Note that depressed
subjects and females demonstrate a similar attributional
pattern; that is, given a success experience (recall that
subjects were told that they had scored in the 93rd per-
centile on the block design task), these subjects attribute
outcome to unstable factors to a greater extent than do
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nondepressed or male subjects. Implications of these
similarities will be discussed later (see Discussion)
.
The therapy main effect approached significance for
ratings of effort, with subjects in the attribution retrain-
ing condition attributing outcome more to effort than sub-
jects in the success only conditions (F = 3.71, df = 1/55,
E = .06). This result reflects the success of the attribu-
tional manipulation.
The sex x depression interaction was also significant
for ratings of the impact of effort (f = 5.9 5, df = 1/56,
E = .02), with depressed males rating effort a more important
factor than depressed females, while nondepressed males
rated effort a less important factor than nondepressed
females
.
Anagram test. Depressed subjects tended to evaluate
their own performance less positively than nondepressed
subjects (F = 2.18, df = 1/56, p = .15). The sex x therapy
interaction also approached significance (F = 2.70, df = 1/56,
£ = .11), with males rating their performance higher than
females in the attribution retraining group, while females
rated their performance higher than males in the success
only group. The reader should note that these self-
evaluations parallel the actual results for performance
measures
.
Phase main effects
. Phase main effects were significant
for all Of the attribution and task ratings. The Newman-Keuls
procedure was used to test for differences between all pes-
sible pairs of means. Results indicated that outcomes during
the pretreatment phase were attributed less to ability, less
to task difficulty, less to effort and more to luck than
were outcomes at therapy and anagram testing. The pretreat-
ment tasks were also less likely to be viewed as evaluative
than were the therapy and anagram tasks. Finally, subjects
felt that they had performed best at the therapy task and
worst at the anagram test.
Credibility of Experimental Manipulations
At several points in the experiment deception played
an important role in the experimental manipulations. During
the pretreatment phase, subjects in the inescapable noise
groups were asked to believe that pressing a correct pattern
of lights would terminate a noxious tone, when in fact, no
action on the subjects' part could affect the presentation
of the tone. During the therapy phase, subjects in the
therapy groups were given false feedback indicating that
they had scored in the 93rd percentile of all subjects
previously tested on the task. In addition, subjects in
the attribution retraining condition were failed on two of
the block design items by being told that time had run out
before they could complete the design. Finally, as part
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of the anagram task, two unsolvable anagrams were inter-
spersed among the solvable anagrams.
in order to provide a stringent test of the credibility
of these manipulations, subjects were asked to complete a
probing final questionnaire regarding their reactions to the
experiment (see Appendix I). it was found that 37 subjects
reported some degree of suspicion about some portion of
the experiment. From subjects' comments on the questionnaire
and during the final debriefing, the subjects' suspicions
were divided into four categories: suspicions regarding
the tone (N = 14); suspicions regarding the percentile
feedback (N = 6); suspicions regarding the anagrams (N = 13);
and suspicions regarding unrelated aspects of the experiment
(N = 9). Five subjects reported more than one source of
suspicion. No subject reported being suspicious of the
false failures on the attribution retraining task. The
distribution of subjects reporting suspicion regarding the
pretreatment, therapy and anagram tasks is presented in
Table 88. The "unrelated suspicions" included such things
as subjects feeling that they had been deceived because
"the multiple choice questions were too extreme"; "I
haven't been told what the experiment was about"; and "I'm
suspicious of all psychology experiments". It was felt
that these suspicions were not likely to have affected the
dependent measures and they were consequently disregarded
in further analyses.
For both the false percentile feedback and the anagram
task, the percent of subjects reporting suspicion (9% and
10% respectively) was judged to be too small to have sig-
nificantly affected results. (Parenthetically, it should
be noted that during debriefing, subjects who had expressed
suspicion regarding the solvability of the anagrams were
asked to identify those items which they felt were unsolv-
able. All subjects thus questioned selected anagrams with
only one vowel as being unsolvable. All of these items
were, in fact, solvable. No subject correctly identified
the unsolvable anagrams.) The percent of subjects report-
ing suspicion about the inescapable tone, however, was
quite large (29%). Consequently, t-tests were conducted
on all measures administered after the pretreatment task
for suspicious versus nonsuspicious subjects in the ND-IN-SO,
ND-IN-AR and ND-IN-0 groups.
The results indicated significant differences between
the suspicious versus nonsuspicious subjects on 7 out of
120 dependent measures. Following the pretreatment task,
suspicious subjects attributed outcome less to effort than
did nonsuspicious subjects in the ND-IN-SO group; suspicious
subjects in the ND-IN-AR group were less likely than non-
suspicious subjects to view the task as being evaluated;
and suspicious subjects in the ND-IN-AR group reported
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themselves to be less serious and less sad than were non-
suspicious subjects. Following the therapy task, suspicious
subjects in the ND-IN-0 group rated their own performance
lower than did nonsuspicious subjects. Following the anagram
task, suspicious subjects in the ND-IN-SO group attributed
outcome less to luck than did nonsuspicious subjects.
Finally, suspicious subjects in the ND-IN-0 group attributed
more scientific value to the experiment than did nonsuspicious
subjects
.
Those differences that occurred immediately following
the pretreatment task indicate that subjects who were
suspicious of their ability to control the tone were less
upset by their failure, took the task less seriously and
took less personal responsibility for the failure. The three
other significant effects are less readily explainable.
In view of the fact that none of the anagram perform-
ance measures were affected by subjects' suspicions regard-
ing the pretreatment manipulation, and that only 7 of 120
(less than 6%) t-tests performed reached conventional levels
of significance, it can be concluded that the credibility
of the pretreatment task was not a significant factor in
determining later responses.
It is interesting to note the distribution of subjects
reporting suspicion on the various task. Given a pretreat-
ment task where subjects were induced to fail, nondepressed
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males were more likely than nondepressed females to report
being suspicious (5:2). On the therapy task, however,
where subjects were led to believe that their performance
had been superior, females were more likely than males (2:1)
and depressed subjects were more likely than nondepressed
subjects (5:1) to be suspicious of the positive feedback.
While the male-female difference on the block design task
can be attributed to differences in actual performance
level (males performed better on the block design task than
females)
,
the male-female difference on the inescapable tone
and the depressed-nondepressed difference on the percentile
feedback cannot be so readily dismissed. This pattern
provides further suggestive evidence of a similarity between
nondepressed females and depressed subjects in taking
personal responsibility for failure while failing to take
credit for success.
As part of the debriefing, subjects were also asked to
rate the degree to which they enjoyed participating in the
experiment and the amount of scientific value they attributed
to the experiment. Analyses of these data by sex, pretreat-
ment condition, level of depression or therapy condition
revealed no differences in subjects' ratings of enjoyment
or the value of the experiment.
Intercorrelations
Intercorrelations among all measures obtained during
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pretesting and anagra. performance measures were computed
and are presented in Table 89.
AS would be expected, SDS scores correlated signifi-
cantly with self-rated sadness (r =
-.37, ^ < .ool). xncreas-
xng depth of depression was also associated with a tendency
to feel less coiranunicative (r =
.30, £ <.ooi) and more
angry (r = .21, £ = .02). SDS scores did not significantly
correlate with seriousness (r =
-.02, p =
.82) or effective-
ness (r = .13, £ = .14). The correlations between most
of the mood questions were significant: the sadder the sub-
jects rated themselves, the less communicative they felt
(r = -.22, £ = .01), and the angrier they felt (r =
-.50,
E < .001); and the less communicative they rated themselves,
the less effective they felt (r =
.36, p < .001).
As mentioned previously, SDS scores also correlated
significantly with the anagram performance measures, with
more depressed subjects tending to perform less well.
Feelings of communicativeness and effectiveness similarly
correlated with the performance measures. Feelings of
seriousness did not correlate with any of the other mood or
performance measures.
As has been found in previous research (Abramowitz,
1969; Hale, 1975; Tennen, 1976), the SDS scores significantly
correlated with scores on the I-E scale (r .22, p = .01),
indicating that self-reported depression is associated with
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a tendency to view reinforcements as external to one's own
control. AS noted above, however, this association is
accounted for primarily by the females. The analysis of
variance of i-e scores indicated a sex x depression inter-
action with depressed males actually scoring more internal
than nondepressed males, while depressed females were more
external than nondepressed females. This finding is
discussed further below.
Intercorrelations among the anagram performance mea-
sures were all significant.
Finally, subjects' report of the amount of their
prior experience with anagrams correlated significantly
with total number of anagrams solved (r =
.19, p =
.03)
total time (r =
-.23, p = .008), and total time following
failure (r = -.20, p = .02). The correlation between
experience ratings and number of anagrams correct following
failure was in the predicted direction but was not signifi-
cant (r = .13, p = .14). These correlations reflect the
validity of the experience rating as a covariate in the
analysis of anagram performance measures.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Major Findings
The present study had predicted that depressed subjects
would demonstrate performance deficits on a cognitive task
relative to nondepressed subjects. Subjects exposed to
uncontrollable outcomes on one task were expected to demon-
strate deficits relative to control subjects parallel to
that of depressed subjects. it was expected that mastery
experiences would raise expectancies for future success and
improve the performance of both helpless and depressed sub-
jects. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that, whereas
learned helplessness reflects a general belief in uncontrol-
lability, depression represents a special case of this belief
whereby failure is attributed to the self. Based on this
distinction, it had been predicted that a procedure which
enhances internal attribution for failure would exacerbate
the depressives' tendency toward self-blame, and would have
a negative effect on subsequent performance. Helpless
subjects, on the other hand, were expected to benefit from
retraining that outcomes are under personal control.
Three major findings emerged from the data: the failure
to find performance deficits as a function of prior exposure
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to uncontrollable outcomes; the finding of performance
differences as a function of level of depression only in
those groups previously exposed to a therapy procedure; and
the finding of sex differences in attribution and in perform-
ance.
The discussion of the major findings is divided into
three sections, each addressed to one of these issues, ivo
major assertions are proposed to account for all of the
findings. First, it is suggested that the learned helpless-
ness model of depression needs to be reformulated to take
into account attributional processes. It is noted that
Abramson et al. (1978) have recently proposed such a
reformulation which is consistent with, although more far-
reaching than the model suggested in the present study.
Second, sex differences in attributional style, in depres-
sion and in response to the different therapies are noted
and preliminary efforts are made to suggest a model to
account for these findings.
Effects of inescapable noise pretreatment
. The results of
the present study failed to confirm the prediction that
subjects pretreated with inescapable noise would show
deficits on later cognitive problems relative to a control
group that had not been exposed to noise or a group exposed
to escapable noise.
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The failure to obtain the learned helplessness effect
appears to reflect some confusion in the literature regard-
ing the definition of learned helplessness which has
recently been clarified by the reformulated model proposed
by Abramson et al.
In the early helplessness studies (for example, Hiroto
and Seligman, 1975), it was suggested that helplessness
learned in one situation generalized to other situations
and could be considered to be an "induced trait".
In their evaluation of learned helplessness studies,
Wortman and Brehm (1975) had contended that learning
deficits displayed in the same situation in which uncontrol-
lability occurred was a "trivial" phenomenon and that help-
lessness was of interest only to the extent that it could
be demonstrated to be an "irrational belief" which occurs
in a new situation in which control is, in fact, possible.
As discussed previously, they proposed a model whereby
expectation of control, importance of the outcome and amount
of helplessness training interact to determine reaction to
uncontrollability
.
Based on Wortman and Brehm
' s model, each phase of the
present study involved a different task presented in a
different room by a different experimenter. It was expected
that the large number of exposures to uncontrollable noise
(and hence the intensity of the experienced helplessness)
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would produce sufficient generalisation to demonstrate help-
lessness in the later setting.
Abramson et al.-s reformulated model presents helpless-
ness as a "logical" (albeit not necessarily veridical)
expectation of uncontrollability which follows from the
attributions the subject makes in a situation which is per-
ceived to be uncontrollable. The range of situations over
which performance deficits occur is considered irrelevant
to demonstrating helplessness; the defining characteristics
are the belief in uncontrollability coupled with performance
deficits
.
Following Weiner's model of attribution theory, the
authors propose that the stability of subject attributions
for uncontrollability determine the chronicity of deficits
in the situation in which uncontrollability occurs, with
attributions to stable factors (task and ability) resulting
in more persistent deficits than attributions to unstable
factors (effort and luck)
.
In the present study, subjects in the three inescap-
able noise groups (ND-IN-0, ND-IN-SO, ND-IN-AR) attributed
their failure at the pretreatment task primarily to luck
(an external, unstable attribute) and least to ability (an
internal, stable attribute)
. Given this attribution
pattern, it is likely that the failure experience had little
effect on subjects' expectancies for success at a later task.
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A recent study by Litman-Adizes (1973) reported
results si^dlar to those of the present study. The author
found that subjects who failed at a task and who attributed
their failure to unstable factors did not show performance
deficits on a subsequent task.
Abramson et al. have, in addition, proposed a new
dimension of attribution,
"global-specific" which is
orthogonal to the "internal-external" and "stable-unstable-
dimensions. This new dimension is proposed to determine
the extent to which reactions to uncontrollability will
generalize to new situations with generalization being
greater the more global the attribute. For example:
Consider a student taking graduate record
examinations (GREs) measuring mathematical and
verbal skills. He just took the math test andbelieves he did very poorly... if he decides
that his poor score was caused by his lack ofintelligence (internal, stable, global) or his
exhausted condition (internal, unstable, global),
or that the Educational Testing Service ... gives
unfair tests (external, stable, global) or that
it is an unlucky day (external, unstable, global),
when he confronts the verbal test in a few minutes,
he will expect that here, as well, outcomes will
be independent of his response, and the helpless-
ness deficits will ensue. If the individual makes
any of the four specific attributions for a low
math score, helplessness deficits will not neces-
sarily appear during the verbal test; i.e., lack
of mathematical ability (internal, stable, specific)
or being fed up with math problems (internal,
unstable, specific) or that ETS asks unfair math
questions (external, stable, specific) or being
unlucky on that particular math test (external,
unstable, specific) (pp. 57-58)
.
in view of the reformulated model, it is apparent
that the amount of exposure to uncontrollability is not
sufficient to determine whether helplessness deficits will
persist over time and will generalize to a new situation.
Since the importance of the global-specific dimension
was not recognized in time to be considered in the present
study, no effort was made to control for this dimension in
designing the experimental situation. In view of the fact
that efforts were made to make each phase of the experiment
appear distinctly different to subjects, it would likely
have required rather global attributions for failure on the
pretreatment task to have produced deficits on the later
anagram task.
Depression effects. Two major findings emerged in the com-
parison of the performance of depressed and nondepressed
subjects: failure to confirm previous findings of performance
deficits in depressed control subjects relative to non-
depressed control subjects, whereas, following exposure to
a mastery experience the performance of depressed subjects
was significantly poorer than that of nondepressed subjects.
Regarding the failure to find performance deficits
in the depressed control subjects, it might be argued that
the use of a nonclinical college population selected
according to the criterion of scoring above the median for
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college students on a paper and pencil measure of depression
.3 inadequate to demonstrate performance deficits. Although,
m his comprehensive review of performance deficits in
depression. Miller (1975) concluded that there was little
evidence of qualitative differences in the performance
deficits Shown by different subtypes of depression, includ-
ing depression in normal populations, he did find that the
degree of deficit was associated with depth of depression,
one would, therefore, expect to find less of a deficit in
depressed college students than in a clinically depressed
population.
Nevertheless, as noted previously, several recent
studies have reported significant differences between
depressed and nondepressed subjects in normal college popu-
lations (Klein and Seligman, 1976; Klein, Fencil-Morse and
Seligman, 1976; Miller and Seligman, 1975; Hale, 1976;
Tennen, 1976; Litman-Adizes
, 1978). Subject selection
criteria appear to have been comparable in all of these
studies. While several of the studies used the Beck Depres-
sion Inventory to measure depression. Hale and Tennen used
the same measuring instrument (SDS) as the present study.
Furthermore, in preliminary pilot data collected for this
study, a correlation of .78 was obtained between the BDI and
the SDS. In sum, it appears that the depressed subjects in
the present study comprised a comparable population to
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those in studies previously reporting depressive deficits.
The present author contends that, in fact, the results
of the present study are not as discrepant with previous
findings as appears to be the case at first glance, a care-
ful analysis of the experimental designs of previously
reported studies reveals that, in several of the studies
(Hale, Tennen, Litman-Adizes)
, the reported differences
between the depressed and nondepressed subjects occurred
after outcome and/or attribution manipulations. The designs
of these studies did not include the comparison of depressed
and nondepressed control subjects.
Moreover, two other recent studies of performance
deficits in depressed college students report a pattern of
results similar to that of the present study. Kilpatrick-
Tabak and Roth (1978) report no difference in the perform-
ance of depressed and nondepressed college students in
control groups, whereas the performance of depressed students
was inferior to that of nondepressed students following
exposure to treatment. And, in a study by Miller, Seligman
and Kurlander (1975), depressed college students performed
more poorly on a discrimination learning task only when
it was presented last in a series of tasks.
In sum, while the results of studies comparing perform-
ance deficits of depressed control college students has
been mixed (Klein; Klein, Fencil-Morse and Seligman; and
109
Miller and Seligxnan report significant differences while
the present study; Kilpatrick-Tabak and Roth; and Miller,
Seligxnan and Kurlander do not)
. reliable differences have
been found when performance is measured on a later task
or following outcome and/or attribution manipulations (the
present study; Hale; Tennen; Litman-Adizes
; Kilpatrick-
Tabak and Roth; Miller, Seligman and Kurlander)
.
A review of the literature on psychological deficit
in depression reveals that a similar phenomenon has been
noted in clinically depressed populations. Several studies
(Payne, 1961; Friedman, 1964; Martin and Rees, 1966; Henry
et al., 1973) have found that performance differences
between depressed and nondepressed subjects emerged only
on the later trials of a series of tasks. The performance
of the depressed subjects is described as showing greater
fluctuations and deteriorating more markedly over time than
the performance of the nondepressed subjects.
Two different hypotheses have been advanced to account
for the finding of depressive deficits on later tasks only.
The first suggests that depressives may be more susceptible
to fatigue, while the second postulates that depressives
are less able to sustain motivation over time.
Miller (1975) has questioned the validity of the first
explanation, however, noting that studies of pain and
fatigue suggest that depressives, in fact, show higher
pain and fatigue thresholds than normals. He notes, on
the other hand, that the methods used to measure pain and
fatigue thresholds confound sensitivity to sensory stimuli
with response bias and concludes that the results of these
studies should therefore be interpreted with caution.
Kilpatrick-Tabak and Roth speculate about the proc-
esses that might underlie an inability on the part of the
depressives to sustain motivation. They suggest that
depressives may reinterpret success in a manner that inter-
feres with subsequent performance, including intrusive
worry about inability to sustain successful performance
and greater susceptibility to feelings of discouragement
on a difficult task. Although they do not identify these
concepts as such, inability to sustain successful perfor-
mance and susceptibility to feelings of discouragement
clearly suggest an attributional interpretation for the
depressive deficit following success.
According to the attribution model, fear of future
failure and lack of persistence following a success
experience would result from the attribution of success
to unstable factors. In fact, this is exactly the pattern
that emerged in the comparison of the depressed and non-
depressed subjects in their attribution for success.
Following success at the therapy task, depressed
subjects attributed the outcome to external and unstable
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factors (particularly effort and luck) to a greater extent
than the nondepressed subjects. Given this pattern, one
would expect that depressed subjects would be less encour-
aged by a successful experience and would be more vulnerable
to discouragement at encountering a difficult problem
resulting in an increasing divergence in the amount of
effort expended and in their consequent performance over
the course of a series of tasks.
Studies examining differences between depressed and
nondepressed subjects in expectancy of success lead to a
parallel conclusion. Comparisons of initial expectancies
have produced inconsistent findings. Some studies have
found evidence of lower initial expectancies for success on
the part of depressed subjects (for example, Loeb et al.,
1967; Hale, 1976) while others have not (for example,
Hammen and Krantz, 1976; Klein and Seligman, 1976; Miller
and Seligman, 1973). When expectancies for future out-
come are measured on later trials of a task or at the end
of a series of tasks, however, researchers have consistently
found that the expectancies of the depressed subjects are
lower than those of the nondepressed subjects even when
performance or feedback was identical (for example, Loeb
et al., 1967; Hammen and Krantz, 1976). Thus, one can
reasonably conclude that the performance deficits shown by
depressives over a series of tasks results from an
attrlbutional bias which dampens expectancies for outcome
on future tasks.
A conceivable alternative explanation for the finding
Of performance deficits in depressed subjects who experi-
enced treatment, given no deficits in depressed control
subjects should be considered. Since subjects in the
present study did not serve as their own controls, it is
possible to argue that the control subjects differed in
some way from the subjects who underwent treatment. Exam-
ination of all measures obtained during pretesting, however,
mitigates against such an explanation.
The analysis of SDS scores, SAT scores and experience
ratings revealed no differences among treatment groups.
The analysis of I-E scores did reveal differences in non-
depressed treatment groups, with subjects in the ND-IN-SO
and ND-IN-AR groups having higher I-E scores than subjects
in the ND-NN-0 groups. This difference suggests, however,
that at least with respect to I-E scores, nondepressed
subjects in the two treatment groups were more like depressed
subjects (more external) than were nondepressed subjects in
the control group. Such a difference would be expected to
have the effect of masking performance differences between
nondepressed treatment and depressed treatment groups,
rather than the difference that was actually observed.
The finding that depressed subjects were more likely
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to attribute success to external factors lends support to
the attributional model of depression suggested by Beck
and confirms the findings reported by Tennen (1976) . two
other recent studies of attributional bias in depression
have similarly found that depressives are more external
for success and they have also determined that depressives
are more likely to attribute failure to themselves (Rizley,
1978; Litman-Adizes, 1978).
One would expect that the attribution of success to
external factors would result in less pride in success.
In fact, the depressed subjects did report feeling less
effective than the nondepressed subjects following the
therapy and anagram phases.
Sex differences. In addition to the differences related
to level of depression which were discussed previously,
the attribution data revealed significant differences as a
function of sex. Specifically, females attributed success
at the therapy phase to unstable factors to a greater
extent than did the males.
While unanticipated, these results are, in retrospect,
not surprising. Previous reports in the attribution litera-
ture have consistently found sex differences suggesting a
bias toward self-enhancement in males and a bias toward
self-depreciation in females. Studies have found that boys
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have higher expectancies of success than girls, that girls
but not boys attribute failure to poor ability more than
success to good ability, and that girls are more likely to
invoke luck explanations in general, while males show a
defensive bias in luck attributions (Feather, 1969; NichoUs,
1975; Deaux and Farris, 1977; see Deaux, 1976, for a review
of other studies of sex differences in attribution proc-
esses)
.
In the present study, the differences that were found
in the attributional patterns of males and females paralleled
the differences found between depressed and nondepressed
subjects. Given the similarity in the attributional pat-
tern of females (depressed and nondepressed) and depressed
males, the pattern of performance differences on the anagrams
appears at first glance to be paradoxical. Recall that
females, whether depressed or not, performed worse on the
anagram task when they had been instructed to view outcomes
on the previous task as dependent of effort. The performance
of the depressed females tended to be inferior to that of
the nondepressed females, but the differences were not
significant. The performance of the males, on the other
hand, varied primarily as a function of level of depression,
with the performance of the depressed males inferior to
that of the nondepressed males. The males, particularly
the depressed males, tended to respond better to the
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attribution retraining, although the differences between
treatment conditions were not significant.
in sum, although the attributional bias of the depressed
males was similar to that of the females, their reactions to
the two treatment conditions were very different, a pos-
sible explanation for this apparent paradox is suggested
by a series of studies exploring reactions to unexpected
success
.
Aronson and Carlsmith (1962) noted that subjects who
did not expect to succeed showed a deterioration in per-
formance following feedback that their initial performance
exceeded their expectations. They explained their findings
in terms of cognitive consistency theory, arguing that
people strive to maintain a consistent view of themselves
and will avoid situations that are incongruent with their
beliefs
.
Later studies of this phenomenon produced equivocal
findings (Ward and Sandvold, 1963; Silverman, 1964;
Cottrell, 1965). Attempts to explain these inconsistent
findings have been of two types: studies exploring aspects
of the situation that would favor embracing versus reject-
ing success and studies examining personality traits which
would separate those subjects likely to accept from those
likely to reject success.
Mettee (1971) took the former approach by hypothesizing
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that some success situations would prove more threatening
than others to low self-esteem subjects. He suggested that
psychological inconsistency was threatening, not merely
because inconsistency is uncomfortable per se, but because
inconsistency also raises the threat of exposure to future
negative consequences. According to Metee, a person with
low self-esteem fears raising false hopes, since s/he
expects those hopes to be dashed by future failure.
Mettee separated these two dimensions of unexpected
success by creating three separate experimental conditions.
In one condition subjects were led to believe that they
would receive further information about their abilities,
thus maximizing both inconsistency and the threat of future
failure; other subjects were assured that future tests would
confirm their failure status, thus rendering success transient
or "self-irrelevant" and minimizing both inconsistency and
the threat of raising false hopes; a final group was assured
that no further information would be provided, thus lessen-
ing the threat of raising false hopes but still arousing
inconsistency with prior beliefs.
Mettee found that self-irrelevant success was accepted,
inconsistent success was somewhat rejected, and success
which was both inconsistent and raised the possibility of
future failure led to the greatest deterioration of per-
formance. These results confirmed the hypothesis that both
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psychological consistency and expectation of future outco.es
Play a role in determining reactions to unexpected success.
Marecek and Mettee (1972) introduced the concept of
chronicity or certainty of self-esteem to explain the
finding of some studies that, following an unexpected suc-
cess, some low self-esteem subjects will show improved per-
formance while others will demonstrate subsequent deteriora-
tion of performance. Marecek and Mettee hypothesized that
subjects whose low self-esteem is chronic have given up all
hope of improvement and will respond to unexpected success
by striving to reduce inconsistency and avoid future nega-
tive consequences. The person who is uncertain of his/her
low self-esteem, on the other hand, is motivated to succeed,
both because success is rewarding per se and because it
provides a means for reducing uncertainty in a self-
enhancing direction. Citing Mettee 's findings, the authors
further speculated that persons with chronic low self-esteem
might accept success if it was rendered self-irrelevant.
Relevance was manipulated by instructing subjects to view
success as due to either luck (transient and self-irrelevant)
or to ability (stable and self-relevant)
.
Results confirmed their reasoning. Following a self-
produced success, subjects certain of their low self-esteem
failed to show any improvement in subsequent performance
whereas subjects uncertain of their low self-esteem improved
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significantly. Following sucoess that was attributed to
luck, both groups improved, but especially the certain low
self-esteem group.
Marecek and Mettee's findings suggest a possible model
for understanding the pattern of results obtained in the
present study. The evidence discussed above concerning sex
differences in attributions and expectancies strongly indi-
cates that females, whether depressed or nondepressed,
suffer stable low self-esteem relative to males. While
depressed males also evidence low self-esteem, the fact
that nondepressed males possess high levels of confidence
suggests that low self-esteem is a transient state for the
depressed males. It is suggested that the low self-esteem
expressed by depressed males is a temporary reaction to
unfavorable life circumstances. Females, on the other hand,
display a characterological bias toward self-depreciation.
Implications of these sex differences in self-esteem are
discussed below. Given this assumption, it would follow
from Marecek and Mettee's findings that females would res-
pond poorly to a self-produced success and well to a self-
irrelevant success, while the converse would be true for
depressed males.
In the present study the attribution retraining condi-
tion corresponds to Marecek and Mettee's "self
-produced"
success. The success only condition, on the other hand, was
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"neutral" with regard to attribution for outcome and no
Clear attributional preference for success emerged in the
success only condition.
Therefore, in order to clarify further the connection
between attribution for success and subsequent performance,
correlations of performance on the block design task and the
anagrams with attributions for outcome during the therapy
phase were computed separately for depressed males, depressed
females, nondepressed males and nondepressed females. The
correlations are presented in Table 90. The above reason-
ing suggests that the correlation of performance with
internal factors (effort and/or ability) should be higher
for depressed males than for depressed and nondepressed
females. The correlation of performance with luck, on the
other hand, should be higher for depressed and nondepressed
females than for depressed males.
Differences between correlations of performance with
attribution for depressed females and depressed males and
for nondepressed females and depressed males was computed
and are presented in Table 91. Results confirmed these post
hoc predictions. For the depressed males, performance over-
all tended to correlate more strongly with effort ratings;
for depressed females performance correlated most highly
with luck ratings; for nondepressed females the strongest
correlation was a negative relationship between effort
ratings and performance; while the correlations between
attributions and performance were small and inconsistent
for nondepressed males. The difference between correla-
tions for depressed males and depressed females was signifi-
cant for the correlation of block design performance with
effort ratings (t = 2.15, df = 30, p < .05), for the correla-
tion of postfailure anagrams with luck ratings (t =
-2.53,
df = 30, £ < .05), and for the correlation of postfailure
time with luck ratings (t = 2.88, df = 30, p < .01). The
difference approached significance for the correlations
of block design performance with ability ratings (t = 1.88,
df = 30, £ < .10), postfailure anagrams with effort ratings
(t = 1.75, df = 30, p < .10), and postfailure time with
effort ratings (t =
-1.73, df = 30, p < .10). The difference
between the correlations for depressed males and nondepressed
females was significant for the correlations of block design
performance with effort ratings (t = 3.33, df = 30, p < .01).
The difference approached significance for the correlations
of block design performance with ability ratings (t = 1.84,
df = 30, p < .10) and for postfailure anagrams with effort
ratings (t = 1.89, df = 30, p < .10).
In sum, these results indicate that the depressed males
performed better on the therapy task and the subsequent
anagram task when they attributed outcomes on the therapy
task to internal factors, whereas the depressed and
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nondepressed females performed better when they attributed
outcomes to luck. These results support the hypothesis
that females (depressed and nondepressed) respond poorly to
a self-produced" success and respond well to a "self-
irrelevant" success. While the converse is true for depressed
males
.
Implications
Success depressions. The relatively poor performance of th
depressed females following a self-produced success can b
viewed as presenting a laboratory analogue to the commonly
observed phenomenon of "success depressions". To the out-
sider, seeing someone react to an apparent success, such as
a promotion at work or the granting of a degree with depres-
sion rather than pride and pleasure appears "irrational".
As the data presented above indicate, however, such a reac-
tion follows logically from the attributional bias of persons
with chronic low self-esteem.
Experientially, such a person reacts to self-produced
success with internal verbalizations such as "I didn't
deserve that and I know that I won't be able to keep it up
in the future. I know I'm going to flop next time and then
everyone will realize that I'm a fraud."
Reactions to failure
. Marecek and Mettee (1972) speculate
about the self-appraisal underlying uncertain low self-esteem,
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They hypothesize that:
being uncertain may indicate that the oerson
.^^''•'^'^"^"^^^^ negative behLiorstems from intrinsic, immutable personal
2h^ii "-^K- ^K^"^ uncertain as to
K f u"-^
chronic self-assessment: appliesto what he actually is (i.e., underlying,finalized dispositional traits) or merely
reflects the surface performance that haspersisted for an extended period but does
not arise from his basic nature (p. 104)
.
In the present study, it was demonstrated that depressed
males attribute success in a manner similar to that of
depressed and nondepressed females. Marecek and Mettee's
speculations suggest the possibility, however, that the
depressed males may differ from the depressed and nondepressed
females in the stability of their attributions for failure.
Tennen (1976) and Rizley (1978) both found that depressed
subjects are more likely to attribute failure to effort and
ability than nondepressed subjects. It is conceivable that
the depressed males particularly emphasize lack of effort
while the depressed females emphasize lack of ability fol-
lowing failure experiences.
One can speculate that such a difference in attribution
for failure might have consequences for the depressed male's
reaction to future failure. While the present study indi-
cates that the depressed male benefits from self-produced
success more than the depressed females, might we not
speculate that, conversely, the depressed male would be more
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vulnerable than the depressed female to self-produced
failure. Since the depressed female is already convinced
of her inadequacy, she might be less affected by failure
attributed to ability than the depressed male who is still
struggling to re-establish high self-esteem. Future
research concerning differential reactions of depressed
males and females to attributional manipulations for fail-
ure would help to clarify the processes underlying chronic
versus uncertain low self-esteem.
Speculations about attributions for failure raise an
interesting conceptual problem in the understanding of
depression first suggested by Abramson and Sackheim (1977).
These authors point out the difference between notions of
responsibility and notions of causality. Causality implies
an empirical dependence between an act and an outcome.
Responsibility, on the other hand, depends upon the determi-
nation of whether or not an individual could have behaved
differently in the situation. Abramson and Sackheim argue
that:
It is understandable that an individual
who feels that a negative outcome results
because of a personal deficit in lacking
an appropriate response also feels res-
sonsible for that outcome,.. [Howevei^
it is illogical to attribute personal
responsibility in situations in which
the individual could not have done other-
wise (p. 847) .
First of all, it is necessary to clarify some semantic
confusion. Ai..amson and SacJchei. seem to use the notion
Of responsibility to mean accountability or blame. m the
above statement they appear to mean that while it is logical
for an individual to assume responsibility or causality
for a personal action which results in a negative outcome,
it is illogical to feel guilty or accountable if the
individual could not have done otherwise.
Recently, Weiner et al. (in press) have elaborated the
attributional theory of affective consequences of causal
ascriptions. They point out that all attributions affect
emotional response and have delineated the most common
specific attribution-affective links. They note that fail-
ure that is attributed to lack of ability is associated with
feelings of inadequacy and incompetence, whereas failure
attributed to lack of effort results in feelings of shame
and guilt.
This distinction offers one possible resolution to the
paradox posed by Abramson and Sackheim. Whereas depression
has been shown to be associated with both guilt and feelings
of inadequacy, it is conceivable that there are two groups
of depressives: one of which predominantly attributes
failure to personal deficits and expresses feelings of
worthlessness and inferiority, while the other blames lack
of effort for failure with consequent feelings of guilt
and shame. The data of the present study would suggest
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that persons with uncertain low self-esteem would be more
likely to demonstrate a lack of effort-guilt syndrome,
whereas persons with certain low self-esteem would evidence
a lack of ability-inadequacy syndrome.
While conceptually plausible, however, clinical
observations of depressives do not tend to support these
speculations regarding two separate depressive syndromes.
Beck (1967), for example, notes that 81% of depressed
patients evidence low self-evaluation and 80% of depressed
patients exhibit self
-blame. Thus, it appears that feelings
of inadequacy and feelings of self-blame co-exist, at least,
in the experience of severely depressed patients. The
question remains, then, as to whether the depressive holds
incompatible and consequently "irrational" beliefs, or
whether there is a logical explanation for the co-existence
of these beliefs.
Recently, theorists have begun to note that the
researchers' mapping of the attributional factors into the
stable-unstable dimensions may in fact be artificial and
distort the distinctions that occur in real life. The
following are some examples of the attributions that sub-
jects could conveivably make which would violate the usual
mappings: "I'm a lazy person" (effort viewed as a stable
characteristic), or "I have not yet mastered algebra"
(ability viewed as an unstable characteristic)
. In their
exploration of the effects associated with various attribu-
tions for success and failure, Weiner et al. (in press) have,
in fact, distinguished between stable effort and unstable
effort. While they found that failure ascribed to either
stable or unstable effort was linked with guilt and shame,
unstable effort seemed, in addition, to be linked with fear
(the authors speculate that this may be because the
performer expects to be held accountable for his/her
actions), whereas stable effort seemed, in addition, more
closely related to feelings of hopelessness or depression.
One can further speculate that ability (or any other
causal attribute) can be thought of as falling anywhere
along a continuum from stable to unstable. One might think
of bone structure, for example, as an innate, inborn
characteristic. A person may hold the following belief:
"I am too short to be a ballet dancer, I just don't have
what it takes," with accompanying feelings of inadequacy or
inferiority in comparison with long-limbed peers. Such a
belief, however, is unlikely to be accompanied by feelings
of guilt. One the other hand, one can conceive of ability
as representing one's current level of skill^ rather than
an innate, inborn characteristic.
Current level of skill can also be thought of as being
A related concept was suggested in a different
context by Marecek and Mettee.
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more or less stable. At one extreme, a person may hold
the belief that: "in order to be a great dancer, one has
to begin practicing at an early age. i didn't begin early
enough and now its too late. I „iii never be a great
dancer and it's all my fault." Such a belief might well
be accompanied by feelings of both inadequacy and self-
blame.
One can speculate that depressives might be particu-
larly prone to attribute failures to stable, but self-
caused attributes. Thus, for example, the depressive
might be particularly prone to view effort as a stable
characteristic (e.g., "I'm a lazy person"), while ability
is viewed as a stable current level of skill (e.g., "i
will never be a great dancer because I let the opportunity
pass me by."). Such beliefs would "logically" be accom-
panied by feelings of both inadequacy and self-blame. One
can further speculate that chronicity of low self-esteem
will be associated with a tendency to view failure as both
unchangeable and self-caused while uncertainty of low self-
esteem may be associated with the attribution of failure
to changeable albeit self-caused factors.
At the other extreme might be a person who views cur-
rent level of skill to be completely flexible. Such a
person might hold the belief that: "I have what it takes
to be a great dancer. All I have to do is practice hard
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enough and I can be as good as anyone." Such a distortion
is, in fact, suggestive of the grandiosity evidenced in
mania. it is possible that mania reflects the obverse
attributional distortions as those observed in depression.
Whereas the depressive views success as transient and
outside of personal control, while failure is viewed as
both stable and self-caused, the manic may well view
success as stable and self-produced, while failure is
believed to be transient and subject to personal change.
While the present study examined distortions in the
areas of locus of control and stability of attributions,
it is likely that depression and mania evidence distortions
along other dimensions as well. As mentioned previously,
Abramson et al. have noted that attributions vary in terms
of their specificity and have suggested that depressives
are more likely to make global attributions for failure
and specific attributions for success. Hammen and Krantz
(1976) demonstrated that following failure, depressed
females choose depressed-distorted cognitions to a greater
extent than nondepressed females and the distortions seemed
to be in the direction of being more global and stable.
Manics may well show the obverse pattern, namely global
attributions for success and specific ones for failure.
In a study of helplessness versus persistence, Dweck
and Goetz (in press) suggest another aspect along which
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attributions may vary, that is, in the timing of their
occurrence. They have noted that helpless children are
quick to make attributions for failure, to "diagnose,"
whereas mastery-oriented children respond to failure with
self-instruction or "prescription." The authors further
speculate as to whether there may be:
...those among the mastery-oriented who
suffer from what may be termed the "Nixon
syndrome "--unusually prolonged persistencedesigned to forestall the admission offailure (c.f. Brickman and Bulman, 1976)^
For such children, as for helpless children,failure may have highly negative connotationsfor their competence; yet rather than surren-der to it prematurely, they persist past thepoint of diminishing returns in the belief
that, as expressed by Richard Nixon, 'You're
never a failure until you give up.' (p. 31).
This description of the "Nixon syndrome" appears to
the present author to be suggestive of the grandiosity
of the manic patient.
In sum, it is suggested that further research into
distortions of attributional processes offers considerable
promise in clarifying the processes underlying depression-
mania and uncertain-chronic low self-esteem.
Etiology
. The data of the present study suggest that
females have a characterological cognitive bias which
predisposes them to respond to stressful life circumstances
with self-blame and feelings of inadequacy. Given this
finding, one would expect that epidemiologic studies of
depression should find that women are depressed more
frequently than men. m fact, this is the case. m their
review of epidemiologic studies of depression, Weissman
and Klerman (1977) note that studies of patients in treat-
ment as well as community surveys from several different
countries consistently report that women preponderate in
the rates of all diagnostic categories of depression.
While the grief reaction following a significant loss
(such as the death of a loved one) shares many features in
common with depression, it is not accompanied by distorted
self-perceptions or self-accusation, and is generally con-
sidered to be a normal and adaptive reaction. Given the
data of the present study, one would have no reason to
expect to find any sex differences in the reports of grief
reactions. In fact, Weissman and Klerman conclude that,
contrary to the findings for depressive illness, there is
no evidence of differences between men and women in fre-
quency or types of depressive symptoms following bereave-
ment.
Given the fact that women display a greater vulner-
ability to depression than men, two questions remain:
what are the conditions necessary to produce a predis-
position to depression; and, are females more likely than
males to encounter these conditions?
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^^^^^^^^^^-n^^l-ln^^ utilizing an object
relations theory framework, Schwartz (1964) presents a
view Of depressive distortion very similar to that derived
in the previous section from an attributional analysis of
inadequacy and self-blame. Schwartz suggests that:
The depressive person is quite able to
IT^^i^r^f ^""^"^'^ ^^^^i^g things?in himself or m other people. However,he does not see himself as having controlor choice over what he causes, and he isfrequently caught up in guilt over whathe perceives as unwanted and unacceptable
effects of his power (p. 696)
.
According to Schwartz, the infant develops a sense of
personal accountability for actions before s/he has developed
the sense of mastery or choice over his/her actions. Schwartz
suggests that the kind of parent-child interactions which
would produce a sense of power without mastery would be
punitive or scolding interactions before the child has the
capacity to recognize the verbal content of the scolding
and/or before the infant is able to exercise control over
his/her actions (e.g., punitive and premature toilet training
on the part of the parents before the infant is capable of
exercising bladder or bowel control)
.
The present author suggests that another, perhaps more
common kind of parent-child interaction which would have
a similar effect would be that of the parent who reacts to
the child primarily as a function of the parent's internal
state rather than as a function of the child's behavior.
For example, a parent who is frequently depressed or irrit-
able and consequently critical toward the child may produce
a sense of "badness" in the child without a concomitant
sense on the child's part of the ability to control his/her
"bad" behavior.
Schwartz hypothesizes that the development of a sense
of power without mastery would form the basis for a
vulnerability to depression. There is no reason to
expect sex differences in the frequency of this type of
parent-child interaction and consequently the initial seeds
for the formation of depressive disorders should be equally
prevalent in males and females.
Development of a sense of mastery
. The opportunity to
develop a sense of mastery and consequently the ability to
maximize positive and minimize negative consequences is
probably a key factor in preventing the development of
depressive disorders. It is in this area, furthermore,
that sex differences are likely to appear. Numerous
writers have discussed differences in child-rearing patterns
likely to favor the development of a sense of mastery in
males. Radloff (in press) reviews the research in this
area and concludes that women are seen by others and are
socialized to view themselves as being passive, dependent,
unsuccessful and in need of help and protection. Thus, it
is suggested that males are more likely than females to
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develop the sense of mastery necessary to overcome a feeling
of destructive, uncontrollable power.
It should be noted, however, that the failure to
develop a sense of mastery is not sufficient, by itself, to
produce the distortions of self-blame evidenced in depres-
sion. Whereas passive, unassertive behavior may lead to
feelings of dependency and neediness, it is the early
development of a sense of destructive power coupled with
the failure to develop a sense of mastery that lead to
depression.
Studies of child-rearing patterns suggest that females
should be more vulnerable to the development of feelings
of helplessness and dependency as well as having a greater
susceptibility to depression.
Attribution training
. Dweck et al. (in press) provide
an intriguing analysis of the contingencies of evaluative
feedback in the classroom that are likely to engender the
kind of bias toward self-denigration that females typically
display in achievement situations. The authors note that
in the early school years, girls are more highly regarded
by teachers, receive higher grades and are given less
negative feedback than boys. In spite of the more favor-
able treatment received by females, however, the way in
which feedback is delivered results in less self-confidence
and greater helplessness on the part of females.
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By use of an observational study of teachers' feed-
back to boys and girls in the classroom, the authors found
that:
frequent and widespread use of negative
evaluation for boys negates failure feed-back from adults as an indicant of their
ability. it makes it more likely thatthey will view negative feedback as eitherirrelevant to their performance or due to
a lack of motivation. In this way they
would learn to attribute academic failure
to effort or to the evaluator's attitudes
or criteria.
. .the more sparing and dis-
criminating use of negatives for girls
makes negative evaluation particularly
informative about the level of ability
displayed (p. 4)
.
Real powerlessness
. As Weissman and Klerman (1977) and
Radloff (in press) note, the real social discrimination that
exists against women leads to legal and economic dependency
and narrows the number of possible avenues by which women
could achieve a sense of mastery.
As pointed out previously, however, the distinction
must be made between helplessness and depression. Power-
lessness may well lead to helplessness, but it is power-
lessness coupled with an exaggerated sense of responsibility
and guilt which leads to depression.
Implications for treatment . The data of the present study
and the speculations regarding reactions to failure and
etiology suggest a number of rather straightforward
implications for the treatment of depression.
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Attribution retraining vpr.n. e^ccess only
. The most
obvious implication stems from the reactions of the depressed
males and females to the two therapy procedures. The posi-
tive response of the depressed males to the effort reattribu-
tion for success suggests that, in persons for whom depres-
sion is a transient response to severe life stress, and
where the depression does not reflect chronic, stable self-
perceptions, encouragement to engage in mastery experiences
will produce positive benefit.
This finding confirms the approach that clinicians have
generally taken in working with clients who are in crisis
(i.e., displaying an acute disruption of their usual func-
tioning in response to a sudden change in life circumstances)
Morley (1965) notes that one of the most important aspects
of the treatment of the client in crisis is to encourage
attempts at active coping in order to restore a sense of
personal mastery. Treatment of persons who have been
victimized (e.g., beaten, raped) generally utilizes a
similar focus, that is, the therapist and significant others
are cautioned to discourage dependency and to encourage the
"victim" to take personal charge of as many aspects of the
situation as possible (e.g., dealing with police and hospi-
tal personnel; making decisions regarding filing a complaint)
As the data from the present study indicate, however,
encouraging active mastery in a person for whom depression
reflects a characterological attributional bias toward
self-denigration may, in fact, be counterproductive. The
present study, and the data presented by Marecek and Mettee,
suggest that for persons with chronic low self
-esteem,
success that is chance-determined is more likely to be
accepted (i.e., to result in further improvement in per-
formance) than success that is self
-produced.
At first glance this conclusion appears discouraging,
however, in that it suggests that, while a person with
chronic low self-esteem can be induced to perform success-
fully, s/he cannot be convinced to change his/her negative
self
-perception (i.e., a lucky success is accepted precisely
because it is irrelevant to one's self-evaluation and con-
sequently does not arouse consistency needs or fears of
future failure)
.
Marecek and Mettee offer an analysis of
the consequences of lucky success, however, which suggests
a more hopeful long-term prognosis. They note that:
Even though a successful outcome is
completely due to luck in an objective
sense, a person may take partial credit
for the success and therapy gently raises
his self-esteem. .. the self-discretion
aspect of a chance success would enable
the low self-esteem person to claim a
degree of personal responsibility for an
esteem-enhancing event (i.e., success)
that would fall short of arousing consis-
tency concerns. A degree of self-
attributed success that does not evoke
consistency needs should be accepted by
the low self-esteem person, and his self-
esteem would rise accordingly (p. 105)
.
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Thus, over a period of time, the person with chronic low
self-esteem may be gradually drawn toward a more positive
self
-evaluation.
Reattribution for failnrp. Given that depressives
tend to exaggerate personal responsibility for failure, it
follows logically that depressives should benefit from
attribution retraining designed to externalize responsibility
for failure. As mentioned previously, the study by Klein
et al. (1976) found just such an effect: depressed subjects
given task difficulty attributions for failure performed
better on a subsequent task than depressed control subjects,
whereas the performance of nondepressed subjects was not
affected by the attributional manipulation. And, as pointed
out by Tennen (1976), in their comparison of performance
deficits in depression and learned helplessness, Miller and
Seligman (1975) noted as an interesting aside that, in
contrast to nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects
exposed to inescapable noise tend to show improved perform-
ance.
In his review of psychological deficit in depression.
Miller (1975) notes that a number of studies have found
that distraction by external stimuli improves the perform-
ance of depressed subjects while it has little effect on
the performance of nondepressed subjects. The mechanism
by which distraction improves the performance of depressives
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has not been explored, although Miller notes that Foulds
has hypothesized that distraction draws the depressive 's
attention away from intrusive internal concerns. The
present author suggests that the distraction effect oper-
ates by providing an external attribution manipulation for
failure. By so doing, it relieves the depressive of per-
sonal responsibility for potential failure, thereby freeing
the depressive to try his/her best to succeed.
While the present study did not expose depressed sub-
jects to failure experiences, nondepressed subjects were
exposed to pretreatment with inescapable noise. Further-
more, the reader is reminded that outcome at the pretreat-
ment task was seen by subjects to be primarily a function
of luck and to bear little relationship to ability. Thus,
the pretreatment can be viewed as an experience of attribut-
ing failure to external sources. Given the finding that the
attributional pattern of the nondepressed female was simi-
lar to, albeit less extreme than that of the depressed
female, it would follow that the nondepressed female
should benefit from training that negative outcomes are
not her fault. In order to test this post hoc prediction,
the performance data for the comparison of subjects pre-
treated with escapable noise, inescapable noise or no
noise was analyzed separately for males and females. The
data is presented in Table 12 and the analyses of
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covariance are presented in Tables 92 and 93. Results
confirmed this prediction. Whereas the performance of
the nondepressed males was not affected by the pretreat-
ment experience, the females given pretreatment with ines-
capable noise solved more postfailure anagrams (F = 3.13,
df = 2/20, p < .07) and took less time to solve postfail-
ure anagrams (F = 3.52, df = 2/20, £ < .05) than females
not exposed to the pretreatment. in sum, nondepressed
females, like depressed subjects, benefit from training
that failure is due to external, impersonal causes.
Personal versus ideological control . The previous
discussion indicates that, while women suffer societal
discrimination which handicaps their chances of achieving,
they tend to blame themselves. Weiner and Sierad (1975)
and Lao (197 0) have suggested that, for groups who are
victimized by discrimination, it may be adaptive to encourage
a distinction between personal control and reality-based
obstacles and, consequently, to delimit the range of
situations in which one attributes failure to oneself.
Prescription for failure
. The observation of Dweck
and Goetz (in press) mentioned previously that helpless
children are quick to diagnose failure whereas persistent
children focus on generating problem-solving strategies,
suggests another avenue for approaching the treatment of
depressive cognitions. The approach is analogous to
Ellis' (1962) suggestion that clients be trained to focus
on what they are doing rather than how they are doing it.
A personal example of "prescription training" occurred
during the writing of this dissertation. Trying to organize
a number of ideas and a large body of literature habitually
resulted in diagnoses of failure (e.g., "i can't do this,
I don't know what I'm talking about") followed by avoidance
behaviors. Confiding this difficulty in my advisor pro-
duced nonjudgmental prescription responses (e.g., "i find
it helpful to make an outline and to break the material
down into subtopics"). This "prescription training" had
the effect of decreasing the frequency of depressive diag-
noses of failure and increasing active coping.
In addition to affecting the frequency of depressive
cognitions, prescription training may also have the effect
of making attributions for failure more specific (e.g., "I
need to make an outline" versus "I don't know what I'm
talking about" )
.
In sum, an attributional analysis of depression sug-
gests a number of possible treatment approaches for the
alleviation of depressive symptoms. Sex differences in
self-esteem and in response to treatment suggests, in
addition, that the clinician be alert to the distinction
between depression that is a transient response to life-
stress and depression that reflects characterological
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distortions in attributions and that treatment be tailored
accordingly.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX
INFORMATION SHEET
Name
:
Sex:
Male
Age:
Year in School:
Major:
SAT Scores:
Verbal guantitative
as
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
No Experience
At All A GreatDeal of
Experience
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APPENDIX B
I-E SCALE
feel (Circle the'%°?o%r'L\\'ie'?trr?! ISIr^^^rnFright or wrong answers-what is imporianfirh^rySS
'"'''tSm^L'o'Suchr^^^''^ "^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ts punish
The trouble with most children nowadays is that theirparents are too easy with them. ^
2a. Many of^the
-happy^things in people's lives are partly
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
3a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is becausepeople don't take enough interest in poimcs!
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people
la.
b.
try to prevent them.
le long run
this world.
4a. In the people get the respect they deserve in
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes
unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.
5a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is non-
sense
.
b. Most students don't realize the extent to which theirgrades are influenced by accidental happening.
6a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective
leader.
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not
taken advantage of their opportunities.
7a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't
like you.
b. People who can't get others to like them don't under-
stand how to get along with others.
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8a.
b.
9a.
b.
"'^^'peL^iSity^^ "^^^^^ determining one's
"they^re'^fke!'"""' '''^ "^'^^ determine what
'
''^''happen?
'^"^^ '^"^
^° happen will
Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me
of action.^
^-c--ion to take a definite course
10a. In the case of the well prepared student there israrely if ever such a thing as an unfair test,
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated tocourse work that studying is really useless.
11a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard word, luckhas little or noting to do with it.
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the
right place at the right time.
12a. The average citizen can have an influence in govern-
ment decisions.
b. This world is run by a few people in power, and
there is nothing the little guy can do about it.
13a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can
make them work.
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because
many things turn out to be a matter of good or
bad fortune anyhow.
14a. There are certain people who are just no good,
b. The is some good in everybody.
15a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing
to do with luck.
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do
by flipping a coin.
16a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was
lucky enough to be in the right place first.
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon
ability, luck has little or nothing to do with it.
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b.
18a.
17a. AS as world affairs are concerned, most of us
stLd'^^rc'ontrol.'^^^^^ ^^^^^
""^af^Iir^ ^r^""^
P?^^ political and socialaffai s the people can control world events.
Most people don't realize the extent to which theirlives are controlled by accidental happenings!
b. There really is no such thing as "luck."
19a. one should always be willing to admit mistakes,
b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.
It is hard to know whether or not a person likes you.
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a
20a.
21a.
22a.
person you are.
In the long run the bad things that happen to us arebalanced by the good ones.
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of abilityignorance, laziness, or all three.
With enough effort we can wipe out political corrup-tion ^
b. It is difficult for people to have much control overthe things politicians do in office.
23a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at
the grades they give.
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study
and the grades I get.
24a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves
what they should do.
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their
lobs are.
25a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over
the things that happen to me.
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or
luck plays an important role in my life.
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26a. P-Pl|^-e^lonely because they don't try to be
^'''"plop^e "iftW too hard to pleasee l . If hey like you they like youT
27a. There^is^too much emphasis on athletics in high
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
28a. What happens to me is my own doing.
b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough controlover the direction my life is taking.
29a. Most of the time I can't understand why politiciansbehave the way they do.
^x Tiici
b. In the long run the people are responsible for badgovernment on a national as well as a localleve^l - ^^aj.
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APPENDIX C
ZUNG SELF-RATING DEPRESSION SCALE
(2) A little of the time- m None of the time;part Of the time; or (S^'Misl oTly^f.^^^ ^ 9°°<3
corresponding to the response iLl L '^^i "^^^ '''^ "™*erPlease do not skip any s?a?emen^s '^"^
1. I feel down-hearted and blue
2.
3.
4.
Morning is when I feel best
I have crying spells or feel
like it
I have trouble sleeping at
night
5. I eat as much as I used to
6. I still enjoy sex
7. I notice that I am losing
weight
8. I have trouble with
constipation
9. My heart beats faster than
usual
10. I get tired for no reason
11. My mind is as clear as it
used to be
12. I find it easy to do the
things I used to do
13. I am restless and can't
keep still
14. I feel hopeful about the
future
15. I am more irritable than
usual
16. I find it easy to make
decisions
17. I feel that I am useful
and needed
18. My life is pretty full
19. I feel that others would be
better off if I were dead
20. I still enjoy the things I
used to do
None
of
the
time
A
little
of
the
time
Some
of
the
time
A
good
part
of
the
time
Most
of
the
time
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APPENDIX D
MOOD SCALES
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indicate how you aL flTHkg ^'^?' ^""^'^ questions
Indicate the extent to which you identify wi t-h ^-hofeeling described in each question by circlina on^ ofnumbers below the question? Please Ln^t'sk?^ any questions,
1. How communicative are you feeling right now?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Extremely
Communicative
11
Extremely Non
Communicative
2. How sad are you feeling right now?123456789 10 11
Extremely Sad Extremely Happy
3. How serious are you feeling right now?
Extremely
Frivolous
10 11
Extremely
Serious
4. How effective are you feeling right now?
Extremely
Effective
10 11
Extremely
Ineffective
5. How angry are you feeling right now?
Not at all
Angry
10 11
Extremely
Angry
APPENDIX E
ATTRIBUTION RATING SCALES
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la. How well did you do on this task?
^ 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very Poorly „
^ Very Well
b. Check here if this task is one in which level ofperformance is not being evaluated
'*
lev^fof^abfutv ? °" ^^^^ ^"-^ a- to
Not at „
All M^^^Much
3. To what extent is performance on this task due to levelof difficulty of the task?
very
Much
4. To what extent is performance on this task due to effort?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at Ve^y
All Much
5. To what extent is performance on this task due to luck?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at Very
All Much
APPENDIX F
BLOCK DESIGNS USED IN THERAPY TASK
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APPENDIX G
ANAGRAM TEST
Word Number Scrambled Form word
1 ULTFA FAULT
2 IGTNA GIANT
^ CIHRA CHAIR
4 IRTNA TRAIN
5 PATOI PATIO
6 M A N L E
7 RPTAY PARTY
8 CIOTN TONIC
9 NRDKI DRINK
10 MHNUA HUMAN
11 EKRLC CLERK
12 RBSCU SCRUB
13 AOTLG GLOAT
14 lUMCS MUSIC
15 S E O N L
16 GAWNO WAGON
17 OHTNM MONTH
18 LCOHT CLOTH
19 HECAB BEACH
20 lUFTR FRUIT
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APPENDIX H
PERCENTILE SCORES FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS*
RAW SCORE
1700
1675
1650
1625
1600
1575
1550
1525 or less
PERCENTILE SCORE
80
85
88
91
93
95
97
99
*Based on a sample of 37 8 UCLA undergraduates tested between
September, 1973 and June, 1975.
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APPENDIX I
SUBJECTS' REACTIONS TO EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
174
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
U.C.L.A.
NOTE: The Department of Psychology is interested in
collecting information concerning the feelings of partici-
pants in experiments. In particular, we are interested in
the issue of deception in psychological experimentation, a
matter which has recently become of some concern and contro-
versy among psychologists. The information you provide us
will assist in making decisions regarding future standards
for research.
We have randomly selected a number of studies being
conducted in the department to administer the following
questionnaire. We have done so without any knowledge of
the content of the experiments. Thus, the experiment in
which you have participated may or may not involve any
deception.
It is important that your answers be honest. You need
not include your name but you may if you so wish. Once you
have completed the questionnaire please place it in the
envelope provided and seal it. Thank you for your coopera-
tion.
1. Do you believe that the experiment in which you have
participated involved deception?
Yes ( ) No ( )
If your answer was yes
,
please proceed to question 2.
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If your answer was no, please proceed to question 3.
were'dece^v^d? "^^"^^ ^^^^^
b) How convinced are you that there was deception inthis experiment?
Very convinced ( ) Somewhat convinced ( )A little suspicious ( )
c) How do you feel about having been deceived?(Assuming that you really were)
d) Do you feel that your behavior in the experiment
was affected by the fact that you were suspicious?
e) Do you believe that the deception involved was
necessary?
f) To what extent did you enjoy participating in
this experiment?
Very much ( ) Somewhat ( ) Little ( ) Not at all ( )
Why?
g) How much scientific value do you think this experi-
ment had?
Very much ( ) Quite a bit ( ) Some ( ) Little ( )
None ( )
h) Had you heard anything about the experiment prior
to participating in it? If yes, what had you heard?
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
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3. a) HOW convinced are you that there was no deceptionin this experiment? ^ ^
Very convinced
( ) Somewhat convinced ( )Not very sure ( )
b) Had you participated in other studies which didinvolve deception? If yes, what is your opinion
Mentation? Psychological e^per?-
c) DO you believe that deception would have added ordistracted from the present experiment?
d) Do you believe your behavior in the experiment
would have differed had you been deceived-? if veshow? ^
e) To what extent did you enjoy participating in this
experiment?
Very much ( ) Somewhat ( ) Little ( )
Not at all ( )
Why?
f) Had you heard anything about the experiment prior
to participating in it? If yest, what had you heard
g) How much scientific value do you think this experi-
ment had?
Very much ( ) Quite a bit ( ) Some ( )
Little ( ) None ( )
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations for SDS Scores
Group Male Female
Mean SD Mean SD
D-NN-SO 27.38 4.90 31. 50 10.38
D-NN-AR 25.88 2.30 28.63 6.05
D-NN-0 24.75 2.96 27 .75 4 RQ1.0-7
ND-EN-0 15.38 3.74 16.00 3.89
ND-IN-SO 15.63 3.42 13.75 6.61
ND-IN-AR 16.13 3.87 14.50 4.90
ND-IN-0 16.00 2.98 17.88 2.23
ND-NN-0 15.00 4.50 12.63 5.63
*Higher scores reflect greater self-rated depression.
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Table 5
Suimnary of Analysis of Variance on SDS Scoresfor Depressed and Nondepressed
~Grou£s
Source df P<
Depressed
Sex (A) 1 3.78 .06
Treatment (B) 2 1.24
.30
A X B 2 0.06 .94
Nondepressed
Sex (A) 1 0.48 .49
Treatment (B) 4 1.15 .34
A X B 4 0.71 .59
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations for IE Scores*
Group
Mean
Male
SD
Female
Mean SD
D-NN-SO 8.38 4.87 13.75 2.96
D-NN-AR 10.38 4.24 12.88 3.09
D-NN-0 8.88 1.73 12.75 3.06
ND-EN-0 8.13 3.48 7.75 2.60
ND-IN-SO 9.63 3.46 9.00 5.93
ND-IN-AR 11.13 2.85 11.13 4.82
ND-IN-0 12.88 3.18 11.00 3.38
ND-NN-0 9.13 4.55 10.13 3.72
Higher scores indicate greater externality.
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Table 7
Summary of Analyses of Variance on IE Scores
Source df PI
All subjects
Sex (A)
Depression (B)
A X B
1
1
1
6.56
2.91
9. 63
01
09
002
Depressed subjects
Sex (A)
Treatment (B)
A x B
15.26
0.23
0.69
001
.80
. 51
Nondepressed subjects
Sex (A)
Treatment (B)
A X B
1
4
4
0.18
2.58
0.28
.67
.05
.89
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Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations for SAT Scores
Group
N
Male
Mean SD N
Female
oJJ
D-NN-SO 7 1166 203 7 1164 77
D-NN-AR 7 1146 147 8 1002 65
D-NN-0 8 1206 139 6 1050 123
ND-EN-0 8 1060 244 7 1207 116
ND-IN-SO 7 1121 100 5 1274 104
ND-IN-AR 8 1209 134 3 993 269
ND-IN-0 4 1248 56 4 1030 97
ND-NN-0 7 1110 157 2 1133 108
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Table 9
Summary of Analyses of Variance on SAT Scores
Source df p
All subjects
Sex (A) 1 1 93
Depression (B) i 0.52
A X B 1 3^03
P<
17
47
09
Depressed subjects
Sex (A) 1 6.07
.02
Treatment (B) 2 1.73
.19
A X B 2 1.47
. 24
Nondepressed subjects*
Treatment 4 0.24 .91
*The uneven distribution of missing scores within this
group made analyses by Sex and Sex x Treatment unfeasible.
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Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations for
Experience Ratings
Group Male Female
Mean SD Mean SD
D-NN-SO 4.75 1.67 5.63 2.33
D-NN-AR 4 . J o / . bO 4 . 88 2.70
D-NN-0 4.00 1.07 6.00 2. 20
ND-EN-0 4.50 2.56 4.75 2.38
ND-IN-SO 6.00 2.20 5.00 2.39
ND-IN-AR 5.00 2.45 4.25 1.91
ND-IN-0 4.25 2.76 6.38 1.92
ND-NN-0 4.13 2.23 4.25 2.12
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Table 11
Smnmari: of Analyses of Variance on Experience
Ratings
Source
All subjects
Sex (A)
Depression (B)
A X B
Depressed subjects
Sex (A)
Treatment (B)
A x B
Nondepressed subjects
Sex (A)
Treatment (B)
A X B
1 2.45
.12
1 0.05
.83
1 1.43
.23
1 3.29
.08
2 0.28 .75
2 0.53
.59
1 0.08 .77
4 0.88 .48
4 1.13 .35
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Table 19
g^^^Y 2L Analysis of Variance on
Communicativeness Ratings: —
Pretreatment Effects
Source df p p<
Sex (A) 1 1.16
.29
Pretreatment (B) 2 0.77
.47
A X B 2 0.04
.96
Phase (C) 3 3.94
.01
C X A 3 1.09
.36
C X B 6 0.85
.54
C X A X B 6 0.91
.49
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Table 20
S3£5!!aril of Analysis of Variance for Sadness Ratings :
Pretreatment Effects
Source df F PI
Sex (A) 1 0.68
.42
Pretreatment (B) 2 0.02
.98
A X B 2 0.28
.76
Phase (C) 3 2.11
.10
C X A 3 0.56
.64
C X B 6 0.85
.54
C X A X B 6 1.06
.39
Table 21
Smmsarx of Ajjalxsis of Variance for Seriousness Ratings:
Pretreatment Effects
Source
A X B
C X A
C X B
C X A X B
P<
Sex (A) , _
1 2.25
.14
Pretreatment (B) 2 2.18 13
2 0.34
.71
^^^^^ 3 3.03
.03
3 0.43
.73
6 1.82
.10
6 0.42
.87
Table 22
SHgmarx °f Analysis of Variance for Effectlvene...
Pretreatment Effects
Sex (A)
Pretreatment (B)
A X B
0.38
.77
0.86
.46
0.58
.74
2.01
.07
1.04
.32
1.61
.21
0.38
.68
Phase (C)
C X A
C X B
C X A X B
198
Table 23
Smnmarx 2l Analysis of Variance for Anger Ratings
Pretreatment Effects
Source
A X B
C X A X B
df
Sex (A) I
P<
0.32
.58
Pretreatment (B) 2 i.se 22
2 1.68
.20
Phase (C) 3 4,97 ^qq3
C ^ A 3 1^34
C ^ B 6 1.11
.36
6 0.41 .87
199
m
di
G
•H
4J
(d
•P
•H
fH
-H
CQ
a -P
O
u;
0 II
1
(N
c
0) 0 i-t
fH •H
£1 4J g
(C (0
•H to
> 0)
54Q 4-1
Q)
73 U
U
(d
a
«j
CO
c
(d
m
G
nj
(U
C
•H
-P
K
c
•H
P
Cn
C
•H
-P
Q
CO
c n n
iH
(U •
s >^
Q
Q
0)
&
0
o
n ^3"
CX3
•
•
o rH o o
n O o 00
in in n
CN fH
OO
OO CO00
fd
fa
c
I
w
IQ
CO
rH
LD
cn
•
•
c\j o H rH
in
CX3
00
00 vo
CM
(0 n3
fa
O
I
2:
H
IQ
o
o
CN
o
vo
o
in
ro
CN CN
in
CN
in
CM
(d
- U ^
W (D -P
tn -P -H
C m ^
•H <
-P
(d II 1
S-l H
Q) roH C g
(d 0 tT« 0
6 •H C (-1
(D +J -H m
fa 0 -P
JQ (d Q)
•H Cn
C
-P (d
o -p >i ^
1 fd cu
td
z 5-1 rH
1 0 a;
a fa ^ 0
2
200
0]
c
•H
(0
to
H o
0
«+^
in (0
CN c
0 4J
(U •H CH U
JQ
(d •H s
Eh >
(UQ
0)
fO
(0
4J
U3
•01
<=!
(til
to
c
n]
0)
•H
P
«
Q
cn
c
to
Q
CN W
en
•H
+J
0)
t7i
cH
-P
(0
Q
C
a
o
o
«3
o
o
•
in
o
o
CN CN
CO
in
in
in
<»
c»
CO 00 ro
00 iH o
• • • •
iH CM CN CN
in
CN
o
in
in CN
0)
rH
e
&4
o
I
IQ
!Z
in
CN
CN
in
o
in
00
00
in
O
I
ZH
IQ
in
in
(N
in
o
CN
O
in
in
in
in
CN
00
m
(N
in
CM
ro
in
in
CM
o
o
in
CN ro
Q) a) CD
iH <-{ fH
03 (0 fO to2 g g
0)
o
I
IQ
2
••
m
D"
a
•H
4J
id
PH
p
u
0
M-i
pa 0)
-P
u u
o
M-I
m
en
CM C
o
(U H c
rH +J
XI
td •H
Eh > fO
(UQ !-l
+J
TJ 0)
fO
'O
C!
«0
-p
w
m
G
ai
(D
S
n
C
•H
P
<N
Cn
C
•H
-P
(0
«
C
•H
-P
to
Q
to
Q
CO
to
Q
C
to
57'
o
ON
00
00
in
o
o
in
(N
o
00 00
00
•
•
(N
iH
(N! CN
OJ
to (0
E
Cm
f»1 rn
00 o iH
• •
rH iH CN
in 00 00 00
CN 00 00 m
•
in in in
o
CM fH
• • •
CN CN CN
CN
00 o o o
00 in o o
ro m ro ro
O
I
W
IQ
to to
S g
o
I
H
IQ
2:
00 o
o
o
CN
ro o
in
CN
(0 to
e
1^
o
I
2
IQ
2
202
CO
tTi
C
•H
-P
fO
pt;
u
a
CO
M u
0 Q)
M-l
*W
in W
c
0 -P
<U •H c
iH -p
XI
fO •H 1
&^ > ro
<U 0)Q UP
T3 Q)
M
fC
-a
fi
(0
cn
c
CO
(0
(U
ro
Cn
C
•H
(0
«
CN
cn
C
•H
-P
to
C
•H
P
05
Q
s
D
CO
c
Q
o
CO n
• •
CM n
o
vo
CN
in
CN
cn
vo
CN
04
00
IT) in
OJ
1^
rH
e
OJ
Cm
O
I
2
pa
IQ
2
CTi vo
ro o cn
• •
•
rH
in
CN
CN
o
o
CN
o
o
CN
00
00
o
o
vo
vo
CM
o
o
in
CN
in vo
rH iH rH H
fO (0
e e
Cm
o
I
zH
IQ
2
in
CN
00
00
in
ro
o
in
ro
o
o
ro
CN
CN
OO ro
CM
O
I
2
2
IQ
2
203
Table 28
^™^^Y 91 Analysis of Variance on Ability Ratings ;
Pretreatment Effects
Source df P<
Sex (A) 1 0.002 .97
Pretreatment (B) 2 0.54 .59
A ^ B 2 0.11 .90
Phase (C) 2 96.59 .001
C X A 2 0.35 .71
C X B 4 1.96
C X A X B 4 1.22 .31
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Table 29
Summary of Analysis of Variance on
Task Ratings ; " —
Pretreatment Effects
Source df
Pretreatment (B) 2 0.49
P<
Sex (A) 1 0.34 .56
.62
A X B 2 2.50 .10
Phase (C) 2 40.22 .001
C X A 2 1.03 .36
C X B 4 4.05 .005
C X A X B 4 2.01 .10
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Table 30
Summary of Analysis of Variance on
Effort Ratings:
Pretreatment Effects
Source df
Sex (A) 1
F p<
0.32 .57
.30Pretreatment (B) 2 1.25
A ^ B 2 0.48
.62
Phase (C) 2 27.01 .001
C X A 2 0.09 .92
C X B 4 0.59 .67
C X A X B 4 0.79 .53
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Table 31
Summary of Analysis of Variance on Luck Ratings ;
Pretreatment Effects
Source df P<
Sex (A) 1 0.29 .59
Pretreatment (B) 2 11.61 .001
A X B 2 0.30 .74
Phase (C) 2 36.72 .001
C X A 2 2.00 .14
C X B 4 11.81 .001
C X A X B 4 1.37 .25
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Table 34
Suimnari^ of Analysis of Variance for Performance Self
-Rating :
Pretreatment Effects
Source df
Sex (A) 1 2.21
P<
14
Pretreatment (B) 2 2.69 .08
A X B 2
2.28 .11
Phase (C) 2 6.48 .002
C X A 2 0.39 .68
C X B 4 8.59 .001
C X A X B 4 1.41 .24
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Table 35
Summary of Analysis of Variance on Task
Evaluativeness Ratings :
Pretreatment Effects
Source df F PI
Sex (A) 1 2.14
.15
Pretreatment (B) 2 0.24 .79
A X B 2 1.03
.37
Phase (C) 2 18.90 .001
C X A 2 0.00 1.00
C X B 4 0.98 .42
C X A X B 4 1.12 .36
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Table 4 3
Summary of Analysis of Variance on
Communicativeness Ratings f
—
Depression Effects
Source
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
A X B
Phase (C)
C X A
C X B
C X A X B
1 0.08
.78
1 0.01
.93
1 0.86
.36
3 0.46 .71
3 0.58
.63
3 0.60 .61
3 0.48 .70
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Table 44
SHSnari. of Analysis of Variance on Sadness Ratings :
Depression Effects
Source
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
A X B
2.93
.04
0.61
.61
0.24 ,87
0.50 .68
1
1
1
0.72
.40
4.10
.05
0.21
.65
Phase (C)
C X A
C X B
C X A X B
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Table 4 5
Smranari. of Analysis of Variance on Seriousness Ratings
:
Depression Effects
Source
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
A X B
Phase (C)
C X A
C X B
C X A X B
1 0.29
.59
1 1.44
.24
1 0.13
.72
3 1.25
.30
3 0.03 .99
3 0.56 .64
3 1.64 .19
221
Table 4 6
Sussarx of Analysis of Variance on Effectiveness Ratings:
Depression Effects
Source
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
A X B
Phase (C)
C X A
C X B
C X A X B
1 0.40
.53
1 1.11
.30
1 0.001
.98
3 0.99
.40
3 1.20
.31
3 0.85 .47
3 0.44 .72
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Table 47
Smnmari: of Analysis of Variance on Anger Ratings :
Depression Effects
Source
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
A X B
Phase (C)
C X A
C X B
C X A X B
1 0.01
.91
1 1.78
.19
1 0.22
.65
3 3.79
.01
3 0.39 .76
3 1.07 .37
3 0.18 .91
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Table 54
Smnmar^ of Analysis of Variance on Ability Ratings :
Depression Effects
Source
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
A X B
Phase (C)
C X A
C X B
C X A X B
1 0.58
.45
1 2.16
.15
1 0.13 .73
2 32.75 .001
2 0.38 .69
2 0.15 .86
2 0.27 .76
Table 55
Summary of Analysis of Variance on Task Rating
Depression Effects
Source df f
Sex (A) 1 Q 79
Level of Depression (B) i 0.41
A X B 1 1^13
Phase (C) 2 11.73
C X A 2 1.57
C X B 2 2.91
C X A X B 2 1.43
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Table 56
Smmnar^ of Analysis of Variance on Effort Ratings :
Depression Effects
Source
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
A X B
Phase (C)
C X A
C X B
C X A X B
1 0.09
.76
1 5.93
.02
1 1.25
.27
2 7.52
.001
2 1.59 .21
2 4.78 .01
2 0.67 .52
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Table 57
Sunjmarir of Anal^ of Variance on Luck Ratings :
Depression Effects
Source
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
A X B
Phase (C)
C X A
C X B
C X A X B
1 0.10
.75
1 1.89
.18
1 0.18
.68
2 9.19 .001
2 1.10
.34
2 0.32 .73
2 2.12 .13
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Table 58
Summary of Analysis of Variance on
Performance Self-katings : —
Depression Effects
Source
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
A X B
Phase (C)
C X A
C X B
C X A X B
1 0.31
.58
1 1.61
.22
1 1.42
.24
2 17.94 .001
2 0.49
.61
2 0.79 .46
2 0.86 .43
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Table 59
Summary of Analysis of Variance on
'^^^^ Evaluativeness Ratings : —
Depression Effects
Source
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
A X B
Phase (C)
C X A
C X B
C X A X B
1 0.15
.70
1 1.34
.26
1 3.72
.06
2 14.96 .001
2 0.09 .72
2 1.84 .17
2 2.71 .08
Table 60
correlations of SDS with Performance Measures :
Depressed and Nondepressed Control Groups
Performance Measure
Anagrams Solved
Total Time
Postfailure Correct
Postfailure Time
Correlation p<
-.05
.78
.03
.86
-.10
.59
.14
.44
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Table 61
elations of SDS with Performance Meas
All Groups
Performance Measure Correlation
Anagrams Solved
Total Time
Postfailure Correct
Postfailure Time
18
18
13
16
.04
.05
.16
.08
237
Table 62
Means and Standard Deviations for
Block Design Scores
Group Mean S.D.
D-NN-SO
Males 16.25 4.13
Females 16.88 3.72
D-NN-AR
Males 17.76 3.75
Females 15. 68 3.63
Males 19.13 0.99
ND-IN-SO
Females 14.88 5.22
Males 18.04 3.18
ND-IN-AR
Females 16.65 3.66
238
Table 63
Analysis of Variance on
Block Design Scores
Source
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
Therapy (C)
A X B
A X C
B X C
A X B X C
1 3.66
.06
1 0.33
.57
1 0.07
.79
1 1.27 .26
1 0.00
.97
1 0.01
.92
1 2.26
.14
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Table 71
Smgnaa of Anal;i:sis of Variance on Coz^nunicativ.r...
Therapy Effects
Source df
A X B
A X C
B X C 1
Phase (D) 3 io.65
D X A 3 0.91
P<
0.36
.55
Sex (A) I
Level of Depression (B) i g 53
^^^^^Py 1 0^05 !82
1 0.001
.97
1 2.36
.13
0.41
.53
^ ^ C 1 0.05
.82
.001
.44
^ ^ ^ 3 4.95 .003
D ^ C 3 0.58 .63
D X A X B 3 1.21 .31
D X A X C 3 0.96 .41
D X B X C 3 0.73 .54
D X A X B X C 3 0.82 .49
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Table 72
Snnmar^ of Analysis of Variance on Sadness Ratings :
Therapy Effects
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
Therapy (c)
A X B
A X C
B X C
A X B X C
Phase (D)
D X A
D X B
D X C
D X A X B
D X A X C
D X B X C
D X A X B X C
11 0.88 .35
1 21.52
.001
1 0.00 1.00
1 0.77
.38
1 0.01
.92
1 2.98
.09
1 0.002 .96
3 12.76 .001
3 0.40 .76
3 0.74 .53
3 0.40 .75
3 0.17 .92
3 0.14 .94
3 0.80 .50
3 0. 34 .80
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Table 73
Suimnari of Anali^
, s
Therapy Effects
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
Therapy (C)
A X B
A X C
B X C
A X B X C
Phase (D)
D X A
D X B
D X C
D X A X B
D X A X C
D X B X C
D X A X B X C
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.01
0.27
0.005
0.20
1.22
0.08
2.53
.92
.61
.95
.66
.27
.78
.12
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1.86
0.12
0.27
0.88
1.29
0.21
0.04
2.88
.14
.95
.85
.45
.28
.89
.99
.04
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Table 74
Summary of Analysis of Variance on v^^^^^.-
— " y^-^ -Lanc Effectiveness Ratings :
Therapy Effects
Source df
P<
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
Therapy (c)
A X B
Axe
B X C
A X B X C
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.04
3.08
0.14
0.001
0.74
0.17
0.93
84
09
71
97
39
68
34
Phase (D)
D X A
D X B
D X C
D X A X B
D X A X C
D X B X C
D X A X B X C
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
9.12
0.17
1.70
0.95
0.70
0.45
1.41
0.47
,001
,92
17
,42
55
71
24
71
250
Table 75
SurrS-S Of Anali^ of Variance on Anger Ratines:
Therapy Effects
Source
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
Therapy (c)
A X B
A X C
B X C
A X B X C
df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.03
10.93
0.002
0.15
0.01
0.80
0.15
P<
,87
,002
96
70
93
37
70
Phase (D)
D X A
D X B
D X C
D X A X B
D X A X C
D X B X C
D X A X B X C
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
10.34
1.47
4.89
1.38
0.34
1.05
0.56
1.25
,001
,22
,003
,25
,80
37
64
29
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Table 82
SujSas: Of Analysis of Variance on Ability Ratings
:
Therapy Effects
Source df
P<
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
Therapy (C)
A X B
A X C
B X C
A X B X C
Phase (D)
D X A
D X B
D X C
D X A X B
D X A X C
D X B X C
D X A X B X C
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1.60
3.07
0.24
0.09
0.61
0.01
4.58
106.28
0.43
2.16
0.21
0.61
0.50
0.48
0.50
.21
.09
.63
.77
.44
,92
,04
,001
,65
12
81
55
61
62
61
Table 83
SiSSSa, Of Analysis of Variance gn Task Ratines
Therapy Effects
Source df
P<
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
Therapy (c)
A X B
Axe
B X C
A X B X C
Phase (D)
D X A
D X B
D X C
D X A X B
D X A X C
D X B X C
D X A X B X C
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
0.16
0.60
0.72
0.60
0.11
0.001
2.06
45.49
0.49
2.19
0.73
0.39
0.21
0.19
0.39
.69
.44
.40
.44
,74
,97
,16
.001
61
12
48
68
81
83
68
259
Table 84
Sxmm^ of Analysis of Variance on Effort Ratings :
Therapy Effects
Source df
P<
A X B
Axe
B X C
4.20
.05
2.01 ,16
Sex (A)
2_
Level of Depression (B) i
Therapy (C) 1 q^^q ^3
1 7.17
.01
1 0.89
.35
1 0.22
.64
A X B X C 1 1^59
Phase (D) 2 53.13
D X A 2 0.72
D X B 2 0.31
D X C 2 0.75 .47
D X A X B 2 0.55 .58
D X A X C 2 0.01 .99
D X B X C 2 0.17 .84
DxAxBxC 2 0.45 .64
21
001
49
74
260
Table 85
SusHSarz of Analysis of Variance on Luck Ratings :
Therapy Effects
Source df
P<
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
Therapy (c)
A X B
Axe
B X C
A X B X C
Phase (D)
D a A
D X B
D X C
D X A X B
D X A X C
D X B X C
D X A X B X C
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3.02
5.68
0.47
0.28
0.86
0.04
1.02
16.47
0.46
24.99
2.20
0.65
0.13
0.64
0.35
.09
.02
.50
,60
,36
,84
,32
,001
.63
,001
.12
52
88
53
70
261
Table 86
SSHnaa, Of Anal^ Of
Therapy Effects
Source df
P<
Sex (A)
Level of Depression (B)
Therapy (c)
A X B
A X C
B X C
A X B X C
Phase (D)
D X A
D X B
D X C
D X A X B
D X A X C
D X B X C
D X A X B X C
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
0.005
2.41
1.03
0.005
0.77
0.77
0.005
77.02
0.68
27.04
0.47
0.79
1.73
2.12
0. 56
.95
.13
.32
.95
,38
,38
,95
,001
,51
001
63
46
18
13
57
262
Table 87
SunnHaD^ of Analysis of Variance onTask Evaluativeness~^gTTnqo-.
—
Therapy Effects
Source
A X C
B X C
A X B X C
D X C
df
Phase (D) 2
D X A
D X B
P<
1 0.11
.75
Level of Depression (B) i 3 g5
Therapy (c) 1 ol,^
1 2.67
.11
1 0.00 1.00
1 0.11
.75
1 0.43
.52
21.70
.001
2 0.17
.84
2 2.10
.13
2 0.17
.84
D X A X B 2 0.17
.84
D X A X C 2 0.52
.59
D ^ B X C 2 0.17
.84
DxAxBxC 2 0.17
.84
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Table 90
eSEESlatioai o£ Attribution Ratings withir^ertormance Measures
Ratings Group
Anagrams Solved Total Time
Postf
ailure
Correct
Postf
ailure
Time Block
Design
Depressed Female
Ability Depressed Male
Ratings Nondepressed Female
Nondepressed Male
-.21
.27
.30
. 07
. 26
-.16
-.25
-.04
-.01
-.02
.11
-.37
.32
.07
.02
.47
-.24
.46
-.22
.40
Depressed Female
Task Depressed Male
Ratings Nondepressed Female
Nondepressed Male
-.06
.31
.09
.18
. 08
-.14
-.09
-.15
-.43
. 20
-.13
.05
.45
.10
.08
.11
-.28
-.08
-.23
-.02
Depressed Female
Effort Depressed Male
Ratings Nondepressed Female
Nondepressed Male
-.11
. 33
-.16
.15
.14
-.11
.12
-.05
-.29
.36
-.35
.45
.43
-.21
.25
-.27
-.07
.65
-.48
-.44
Depressed Female
Luck Depressed Male
Ratings Nondepressed Male
Nondepressed Female
.43
.02
-.05
.03
-.50
-.05
.09
-.04
.68
-.15
-.20
-.35
-.71
. 22
. 21
.45
.35
. 32
.34
. 22
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Table 92
Surana^ of Analyses of Covariance onPerformance Measures tor Fem^f^oT-
Pretreatment Effects
Perfonnance Measure
Anagrams Solved
Total Time
Postfailure Correct
Postfailure Time
Table 9 3
Summary of Analyses of Covariance
Performance Measures tor MalesT
Pretreatment Effects
Performance Measure df
Anagrams Solved
Total Time
Postfailure Correct
Postfailure Time
2 0.82
2 0.81
2 0.12
2 0.07
1

